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Abstract
Globalization has created opportunities and pressures that require cooperation beyond the nation-state.
As a consequence, national governments worldwide are delegating governance tasks to international
organizations. These organizations are now vital actors in efforts to address global challenges and
overcome collective action problems, but public opposition has the power to severely curb their
effectiveness. Yet to date, we know very little about public support for those global governance
organizations that have not been heavily politicized in the public domain. This raises the important
question of why some organizations involved in global governance become politicized and contested
by the public, whereas others do not? And what shapes people’s initial attitudes about such complex
organizations?
This dissertation develops a broad theory for when global governance organizations become
politicized and, in the process, perceived as illegitimate by the public. Across three substantive chapters,
comprising six original experiments, I first examine support for global private governance in general, then
in the context of environmental standard-setting, and finally I expand the scope to examine support
for global governance more broadly. In contrast to explanations based on people’s sincere preferences
about what type of governance is legitimate, I argue that politicization is largely a function of elite
messages that contain affective cues about an organization’s legitimacy. I show that information about
non-governmental governance that is beyond the control of democratic nation-states does not, by itself,
depress support. Rather, it takes elite rhetoric affectively tagging these institutions as illegitimate to bring
about this attitude change. Moreover, in seeking to elucidate these processes, I also develop a novel
way of conceptualizing and measuring framing effects. Here, I examine how exposure to frames about
organizations that people know very little about has the power to not only shape attitudes but change
how people make sense of these organizations in the first place.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“We need to reflect on what we, as political scientists, know that could
help actors in global society design and maintain institutions that
would make possible the good life for our descendants”
—Robert Keohane, 2000 APSA Presidential Address
Robert Keohane’s 2000 American Political Science Association’s Presidential Address (Keohane
2001), fromwhich the opening epigraph is drawn, introduced a governance dilemma: while globalization
requires effective governance and global society benefits from the international proliferation of rules and
cooperative institutions, endowing international bodies with more power also threatens liberty, thereby
undermining these very institutions’ legitimacy. A similar argument was also made by Anne-Marie
Slaughter (2004), who recast this dilemma as the ‘globalization paradox.’
Indeed, globalization has created opportunities and pressures that require cooperation beyond the
nation-state. As a consequence, national governments across the globe are either explicitly or implicitly
delegating myriad governance tasks to international organizations as a means to address a range of
collective action problems. From efforts to mitigate the impacts of a changing climate to regulations
that enable efficient international trade, authority is being ceded to organizations that are not the elected
governments of nation-states. Recently, however, these normative endeavors have come into conflictwith
domestic politics. Not only does international commitment to global cooperation seem weaker than in
the past (Haufler 2018), but political renationalization and a retreat from global cooperation are staples of
European populist parties’ rhetoric (Zürn 2018). In the United States, the rhetoric of President Donald
Trumphas targeted a range of global organizations such as theUnitedNations (UN) as well as the notion
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of global governance more broadly (cf. Posner 2017).
Despite these developments, global governance organizations are not equally politicized, which in
this dissertation I understand as being contested in the public domain such that people believe an issue
should be subject to public deliberation. The prime example of a shift from a depoliticized entity to
a politicized entity can be found in the experience of the European Union (EU). Nearly fifty years ago,
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) described public contestation vis-à-vis the EU as dormant, and described
an era exhibiting a ‘permissive consensus’ in which elites were allowed to forge ahead with cooperation
while the public played a passive role and its opinions had no impact on the workings and effectiveness
of the organization. This period has famously come to an end, as most forcefully illustrated by the UK
Brexit vote. It is now accepted that public opinion is consequential to the organization’s legitimation (see
also Hobolt 2009; 2012).
What is interesting, however, is that the EU outperforms similar regional integration bodies, which
are not politicized, on multiple indicators of democratic accountability and legitimacy (Duina and Lenz
2018). Butprominent accounts seeking to explainpoliticizationposit that this process occurswhenpeople
realize howmuch authority is yielded to un-elected organizations at the expense of national governments.
This raises the important question ofwhy someorganizations involved in global governance have become
politicized and, in turn, contested by the public whereas others have not? Moreover, are politicians who
draw attention to and criticize the democratic deficit in these bodies tapping into a genuine concern on
the part of the public? And how do people come to develop attitudes about such complex organizations
in the first place?
This dissertation takes on these questions by concentrating on the power of framing. In contrast to
explanations based on people’s sincere preferences about what type of governance is legitimate, I argue
that politicization is a function of elite messages that contain affective cues suggesting whether or not
an organization is legitimate. I show that information about governance that is beyond the control of
democratic nation-states does not by itself depress support. Rather, it takes elite rhetoric affectively
tagging these institutions as illegitimate to bring about this attitude change. Moreover, in seeking to
elucidate these processes, I also develop a novel way of conceptualizing and measuring framing effects.
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Here, I examine how exposure to frames about attitude objects that people know very little about has the
power to not merely change attitudes, but to shape the way people understand these issues in the first
place.
In developing these arguments, I depart from much of the extant scholarship that focuses on
explaining the politicization of the EU and turn to examining organizations that have, to date, largely
escaped the public discourse. I argue that focusing on the EU or other prominent bodies such as the
UN or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is problematic because researchers are theorizing about
— and subsequently empirically testing — the dynamics involved in how international organizations
become politicized by studying institutions that cannot provide valid counterfactuals since these bodies
have already been politicized. Therefore, I turn to lesser known organizations that have only recently
been identified as powerful international actors in the international relations and international political
economy literature (e.g., Büthe and Mattli 2011) to examine the factors that shape public perceptions of
these organizations.
Overall then, this dissertation develops a broad theory for when global governance organizations
become politicized and, in the process, become perceived as illegitimate by large swathes of the
population. Across three substantive chapters, comprising six original studies, I first examine support for
global private governance in general, then in the context of environmental standard-setting, and finally I
expand the scope to examine support for global governance more broadly by paying particular attention
to variation in institutional design that can characterize a range of global governance organizations.
In the process, this dissertation provides the first comprehensive assessment of public opinion
toward global private regulatory bodies — a class of organizations that includes diverse entities such
as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
These organizations are the focal institutions in their respective fields of regulation, meaning that they
develop and monitor rules which countries and businesses adopt. These organizations, however, are
private entities and thus their roles are not mandated by, or enshrined in international law, leading to
their classification as non-state market-driven governance systems (Cashore 2002). While the precise
institutional arrangements differ within this class of organizations, they generally develop rules by
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involving multiple stakeholders from industry, academia, and sometimes citizen advocacy or pressure
groups. Moreover, in cases such as the ISO, their membership includes representatives from national
standard-setting organizations. These organizations clearly differ from many of the more well-known
international bodies such as the EU or the UN because they lack the formal involvement of national
governments. Importantly, therefore, I also extend my empirical analyses beyond this narrow form of
global governance to global organizations more broadly. In particular, by also examining hypothetical
institutions that are characterized by institutional arrangements that capture institutional configurations
prevalent in a plethora of international organizations, I am able to generalize beyond private global
governance. In sum, then, the dissertation provides a generalized framework for understanding when
global governance organizations will face public opposition.
In Chapter Two, against the backdrop of recent critiques of the framing concept, I develop a novel
way of conceptualizing framing effects that makes the concept more distinguishable from related media
effects concepts and points to its unique added value. Substantively, in the broader context of the
dissertation, I suggest that this framework lays the foundation for the analyses that follow by elucidating
how people come to hold attitudes about global private standards organizations. My theoretical account
substantiates how repeated exposure to frames can powerfully affect not just attitudes toward global
private governance organizations, but also how people come to understand these and other complex
political issues. I develop novel survey instrumentation to measure the degree to which frames become
cognitively internalized and thus help people make sense of political issues. I implement these new
measures in two original survey experiments and validate how cognitive internalization can be measured
in a variety of ways. Using this technique, I show that frames need not always affect attitudes to be
consequential but rather that the power in repeated framing lies in its ability to shape the way people
understand complex political issues. This innovation helps substantiate cognitive internalization as a
psychological mechanism underlying framing effects that is distinct from the framing-as-accessibility,
framing-as-applicability or framing as belief change paradigms. Using this framing approach, the paper
is thus able to substantiate how the information people receive about these organizations matters to how
they understand these bodies, and in turn whether they perceive them as legitimate.
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In Chapter Three, I take up the question of what drives support for global governance. In particular,
I draw on diverse strands of political science literature, from the politicization of European integration to
the concept of stealth democracy. Here, I argue that the commonly invoked authority transfer hypothesis,
which suggests that the public will reject global governance organizations after learning about their often
non-democratic, supranational character and the potential for distributive consequences is incorrect.
Rather, I argue, the public only starts rejecting these organizations when elites frame them in ways that
suggest they are undemocratic. Importantly, I posit that this is not solely a partisan dynamic whereby
people take cues from in-party elites, but rather that this is a more general dynamic of responsiveness
to national elites. To test my theoretical account, I again turn to private governance organizations.
More specifically, I examine support for such organizations in the context of private environmental
standard-setting. Drawing on evidence from two survey experiments, I show that public support
for global private governance is surprisingly large, even when people learn about the decision-making
structures. However, once national political elites ‘politicize’ these bodies, the public follows suit and
rejects them as illegitimate.
In Chapter Four, I broaden my focus beyond global private governance to test competing theories
of when the public will come to oppose global governance in more general terms. Here, I disaggregate
global governance organizations to study how variations in specific institutional features affect support
for organizations. I again contrast this with the role that elite rhetoric plays in driving public opposition.
Specifically, I compare the relative impact of different institutional configurations and elite frames on
levels support for hypothetical regulatory bodies operating at either the domestic or international level.
Leveraging a conjoint experiment fielded on two samples, I show that while some information about
institutional features can affect public support, there is no evidence that information about organizations’
increased authority or of decreasing control exercised by national governments affects support. In
contrast, again, domestic elite rhetoric — sometimes even from out-partisans — powerfully decreases
support.
In Chapter Five, I conclude the dissertation by summarizing its findings, contributions, and
implications for scholarship across diverse political science literatures. Moreover, I discuss limitations
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of the work and outline how future research can build on the foundation set out in this dissertation
to further advance both our understanding of framing dynamics and public opinion toward global
governance.
6
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Chapter 2
From a ‘Central Organizing Idea’ in a Frame to a ‘Central Organizing Idea’ in the
Brain: The Psychology of Framing Effects Revisited
introduction
Framing effects have become ubiquitous in political communication research. On the one hand, it has
become abundantly clear that even subtle changes in the framing of information can lead to significant
changes in political attitudes and evaluations. On the other hand, some scholars have recently questioned
the usefulness of the framing concept (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Cacciatore et al. 2016; Leeper and
Slothuus 2017). These critiques assert that ‘framing’ has become shorthand for a multitude of distinct
media effects and that much of the extant literature adopting the framing framework fails to distinguish
framing from related processes such as persuasion or priming. Indeed, while some recent research has
begun to pay closer attention to the underlyingmechanisms producing framing effects, a stark disconnect
remains between the power ascribed to frames in their various conceptualizations and the understanding
we have of how these frames structure people’s thinking.
This chapter sets out to redeem the framing concept by shifting the focus of inquiry from ‘attitudes’
to ‘understanding’. Inspired in part by the work of Berinsky and Kinder (2006), I examine whether
exposure to frames affects the way in which people draw on information when thinking about the issue
at hand. In line with early conceptualizations of issue frames as providing a ‘central organizing idea’
(Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143), I outline whether this property of the frame in turn becomes a
property in the brain that allows people tomake sense of entire classes of attitude objects based on frames
they were previously exposed to. That is, I develop a new measure capturing the extent to which people
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use a frame in subsequent sense-making and then empirically test whether frames can become cognitively
internalized. Substantively, I lay the foundation for the rest of the dissertationby leveraging this ‘cognitive
internalization’ framework to explain how people come to hold attitudes towards the types of global
governance organizations that are the subject of the remaining chapters.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide some background on the concept of framing,
focusing primarily on how research has sought to conceptualize the mechanism leading to ‘framing
effects’. Second, I introduce the idea of cognitive internalization, suggesting that exposure to frames
might have a more structural effect on issue dimensions that respondents know little about, such
that they provide respondents with information fostering a certain understanding of a new attitude
object. Third, I briefly outline a general way to measure this concept of internalization that leverages
an open-ended survey prompt. Fourth, I discuss how this approach can be adopted to study people’s
opinions toward global private regulatory governance. Fifth, I conduct an initial single-shot experiment
to validate different measures of internalization and show the usefulness of the concept. Sixth, I conduct
a three-wave, repeated exposure experiment to more thoroughly test whether people internalize frames
they are exposed to as well as whether such internalization is consequential. I conclude with a summary
and implications for the broader literature on framing.
framing effects and mechanisms
In thepolitical science literature, scholars usually refer to a framing effect as somedifference inpreferences,
attitudes or evaluations that is the result of (oftentimes subtle) differences in the way an issue was
presented to individuals. Such frames have been found to alter expressions of attitudes on issues as
diverse as affirmative action, the Kosovo conflict, opposition to KKK rallies, and support for European
integration (see e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007a; Berinksy and Kinder, 2006; Nelson et al. 1997).
While a litany of studies have thus demonstrated that framingmatters, they often use vastly different
conceptualizations and operationalizations of frames. Early work in psychology focused on equivalency
frames in which equivalent information was presented in subtly different ways. Here, Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979) work suggested a very clear mechanism leading to framing effects, rooted in prospect
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theory. Frames, while equivalent in information, change whether people think about losses and gains
which in turn alters their willingness to take risks (cf. Chong and Druckman 2007a). In contrast, much
of the political science literature has adopted a conceptualization of so-called issue frames, where an issue
is presented from two different angles, whereby the information itself is not logically equivalent. Here,
I focus on the types of frames that are usually considered ‘issue frames’ or ‘emphasis frames’ and, in
particular, on frames regarding attitude objects that people know little about. Oneof themost commonly
cited definitions of such frames suggests that they provide “a central organizing idea or story line that
providesmeaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests
what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143). It is worth
noting that this emphasis leads to a conflation of frames and the content of messages (e.g., Leeper and
Slothuus 2017; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012), but it is nonetheless evident that this conceptualization of
frames reflects realisticmessages as they exist in the actual information environment (cf. Vraga et al. 2010).
Now that I have introduced the types of frames I am interested in, the central question is how these
frames impact attitudes. Ameta-analysis in the communications literature found that amere 11 percent of
framing effect studies (study n=90) explicitly examined the underlying mechanism mediating any effect
(Borah 2011: 255). Hence a vastmajority of applied studies in political science and communication studies,
while producing important research on the effects side, have not contributed to a deeper understanding
of the framing mechanism. Comparatively few scholars have sought to unpack the black box of framing
by trying to elucidate the psychological mechanisms producing these effects. Below I provide an overview
of the work that has engaged this important question.
A first step for this literature was differentiating framing from priming. Indeed, some early studies in
the literature highlighted accessibility as the key mechanism underlying framing effects (e.g. Kinder and
Sanders 1996: 174). In this conception, framing effects are simply the product of priming whereby some
considerations aremademore accessible than others in a respondent’smemory. Thus, attitude expression
following exposure to a frame is conceived through a memory-based information processing model such
that respondents are drawing on the information that comes to mind at the time that they are asked to
render a judgment (cf. Hastie and Park 1986). It should be noted that this mechanism is considered the
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most automatic or subconscious of the potential mediation processes. Here, framing simply leads to
shifting attitude expression because the frame makes certain considerations more readily accessible.
Other early studies acknowledged that, while frames could operate in the same way as primes,
there probably was a different process taking place. Here, a second mechanism can be described as an
applicability or ‘belief importance’ change effect. Here, frames produce connections between different
considerations and thusmake some aspects of the storymore relevant than others (e.g. Nelson,Oxley and
Clawson 1997ab; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Price et al. 1997). This applicability
paradigm permeates most of framing research and suggests that frames simply change the relevance that
people assign to different considerations rather than changing their opinion in lasting ways. Nelson,
Oxley andClawson’s (1997b) study, for instance, tested both the aforementioned accessibilitymechanism
and the perceived importance mechanism. In their study, respondents read about a KKK rally framed
either in terms of ‘free speech’ or in terms of ‘public order’. Following exposure to the frames, half of
the respondents completed a word association task in which letter strings popped up on their screens
and respondents had to indicate whether the words were true English words. If simple priming was at
work, those exposed to frames should have been quicker to identify letter strings associated with the
frame they were exposed to (because these concepts should be more accessible). They found no such
effect. In contrast, the other half of respondents were asked to consciously rate values associated with free
speech or public order in terms of their importance to the issue at hand. Here, respondents rated values
associated with the frames they were exposed to as more important. Thus, the authors concluded that
belief importance and not accessibility mediated the framing effect.
The third mechanism some have presumed to underlie framing effects focuses on persuasion or
belief content change (Chong and Druckman 2007). This approach suggests that different ways of
framing lead people to have different beliefs about the characteristics of the specific attitude object in
question (see e.g. Slothuus 2008; Lecheler and de Vreese 2012). Here, framing simply affects attitudes
through an information provisionmechanism that can be conceptualized along the lines of Zaller’s (1992)
receive-accept-sample framework. In recent work, Leeper and Slothuus (2017) seek to isolate the effect
of information provision from the effect of emphasis framing. In particular, respondents were first
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exposed to vignettes providing substantively different content (mimicking previous framing studies). But
then they crossed this manipulation with a vignette that did not provide new information but rather
just emphasized an aspect of the story they were previously exposed to. Thus, this second vignette
asked respondents to consider the issue in terms of one specific dimension that was already previously
introduced, thereby providing no new information. Across ten studies and 15 experiments they show
that the information provision affected attitudes whereas the emphasis manipulation did not. This, they
suggest, is evidence that most framing studies are simply the result of respondents being provided with
novel information. In the case of the famous KKK rally example, this argument then contends that a
frame emphasizing the rally’s endangerment of public safety will change beliefs about the KKK in amore
negative direction (as people had not considered that fact) and then support for the rally would decrease.
Relatedly, Slothuus (2008) proposes a dual-process model of framing. He argues frames may change
either the importance placed on considerations and/or the content of these considerations. He argues
that individual-level differences in political sophistication and values determine which process will be
most effective. First, he finds limited or no effects of exposure to frames among the least aware or those
who have strong pre-existing values on dimensions relevant to the attitude object (e.g., values about
economic inequality when the issue under consideration is social welfare). He suggested that the least
aware have insufficient numbers of considerations to affect and those with strong pre-existing beliefs are
able to counter the information. In terms of mechanisms, he finds that importance change mediates the
framing effect for highly aware respondents (as these respondents have crystalized beliefs but can shift
in perceptions of importance) whereas both importance change and changes in considerations mediate
the effect for the moderately aware and those with weak related values. Similarly, Baden and Lecheler
(2012) argue that these mediators are complementary processes and that frames have to leave some trace
inmemory for there to be durable and persistent effects. This conception thus leaves out accessibility and
subsequent investigation in this area has focused on changing belief importance and belief content. This
has been assessed through mediation analyses that have shown that framing effects can be mediated by
processes associated with both approaches (e.g. Lecheler and de Vreese 2012).
Berinksy andKinder (2006) take a different approach to elucidating framingmechanisms by focusing
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on how frames change the way that people understand a given issue (see also Jones and Song 2014). Thus,
they explicitly examine the effects of frames on the structuring of information. In so doing, their focus
is not primarily on attitudes as the dependent variable but rather on concepts measuring respondents’
understanding of the issue. Specifically, they hypothesize that “first, successful frames should increase
citizens’ ability to remember facts pertinent to that frame. Second, frames should lead citizens to organize
facts in their memory into clusters that follow the essential logic of the frame” (Berinksy and Kinder
2006: 646). These two concepts were measured with a free recall task and a categorization task. The
first measure enables the examination of whether subjects remembered facts associated with the frame
they were exposed to. In line with their predictions, they find that exposure to different frames led to
different recall patterns. For the second measure, respondents were asked to group a number of terms
related to the topic of the article into separate clusters. Here, respondentswere providedwith a number of
terms (e.g., NATO, ethnic cleansing etc.) and asked to sort them into categories. Again, there were some
important clustering differences between the two treatment groups such that they categorized different
terms together. The evidence from these two tests provides initial empirical support for the conjecture
that frames structure political understanding. It is important to note that this study did not manipulate
the content of the texts but rather produced different emphases by re-arranging bits of texts to better fit a
certain narrative structure (e.g., using different sentences as subheadings and placing arranging text either
at the beginning or within the paragraph to manipulate emphasis).
While the preceding review of the literature reveals that some scholars are increasingly interested
in understanding the mechanisms underlying framing effects, such explicit unpacking and testing of
underlyingmechanisms is still relatively rare given the size of the literature demonstrating framing effects.
Moreover, these recent advances suggest that there probably is no one single mediation mechanism, but
rather that these effects are the product of multiple processes. This paper sets out to add to this literature
by attempting tomeasure one potential mechanism, namely the idea that people internalize the structure
of frames they are exposed to and subsequently use these in their sense-making.
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cognitive internalization
The above discussion highlights some progress has been made toward a better understanding of framing
mechanisms. That being said, several important issues remain unresolved.
First, while scholars often point toward two different conceptions of frames, namely frames in
communication and frames in cognition, there has been little effort to more closely integrate these
approaches. Most framing studies primarily deal with single-shot experiments in which the effect of a
certain stimulus (the approximationof some frame) on attitudes is examined. However, the true power of
a frame, I suggest, is based on the fact that it is perpetuated through ‘repeated exposure throughmultiple
venues over long periods of time — a whole curriculum of exposure’ (Kinder 2007: 158). Rather than
examining the direct effect of one way of framing an issue on subsequent expressions of attitudes, more
attention should be devoted to understanding the power of systematically perpetuated frames. Gilliam
and Iyengar (2000), for instance, argue that local news reports of crime follow a common script in which
crime is portrayed as violent and the perpetrators are often portrayed using racial imagery. They show
how exposure to this script changes peoples attitudes towards criminal justice processes and African
Americans. Thus, rather than studying the one-off effects of a particular frame, more emphasis needs
to be placed on the effects of continued exposure to certain ways of framing an argument.
Second, and relatedly, the aforementioned types of framing provide recurring narratives that have the
potential to change the way people make sense of issues. Thus, rather thanmerely focusing on the effects
of such frames on attitudes and evaluations,more research is required intohowsuch frames shapepeople’s
understanding of political issues. Taken together, these gaps in our knowledge call for a framework that
allows us to examine how repeated exposure to ‘real’ frames affects how peoplemake sense of the political
world. The question then, simply put, is whether the ‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson andModigliani
1987: 143) of the frame can become the ‘central organizing idea’ in the brain.
Therefore, I am interested in the extent to which people adopt the structure of the frame they
are exposed to when making their own deliberations on related issues. Here, my approach follows
a logic similar to that of Berinsky and Kinder (2006), who importantly highlighted the need to look
beyond attitude change and also consider the role of frames in structuring understanding. My work goes
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even a step further by examining whether frames become cognitively internalized and act as ‘internal
guidelines’ for the subsequent evaluation of attitude objects other than the one directly discussed. The
idea here is that the framing of an issue is internalized in such a way that peoples’ thinking on the issue is
subconsciously structured along the dimensions that are central to the frame. In contrast to Berinsky and
Kinder (2006), however, I am not merely interested in whether frames affect recall and simple concept
categorization, but whether people adopt the frame they have previously encountered when making
sense of new information pertaining to an entire class of objects. I posit that one of the key mechanisms
throughwhich repeated frames affect attitudes and evaluations is by developing a ‘central organizing idea’
that people rely on when encountering new information such that they have established a new cognitive
architecture that allows them to abstract away from the information provided in the frame to a host
of related attitude objects. For instance, in the Gilliam and Iyengar case mentioned above, do people
structure new information about a crime using the script provided in the media? Here, I use the term
structure to denote something that has become internalized as opposed tomerely having beenmademore
accessible or applicable.
Importantly, I conceptualize the effect on ‘understanding’ as quite distinct from simple accessibility
or applicability. Here understanding is seen as a process that is most pertinent when people encounter
new attitude objects and thus frames will establish an initial belief structure and subsequently leave a
trace in memory. Conceptually, cognitive internalization is related to the ideas of scripts, schemas, or
thinking by analogy (e.g. Gick andHolyoak 1980; 1983; Kuklinski et al 1991; Abelson 1981). In a way it is a
generalization of these various ideas for the domain of framing. For instance, it differs from ‘thinking
by analogy’ because it has broader applicability beyond problem solving and does not require direct
hints for the process to be set into motion. Cognitive internalization implies that elements of a frame
are retained as cognitive structures thus encompassing the concepts of schemas or scripts. It is broader
than a script as there are no constraints on the form that this internalization takes. It is conceivable that
cognitive internalization leads to the development of a new schema, but in the current discussion I more
broadly consider cognitive internalization to encompass any process through which elements of frames
are integrated into memory.
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In sum then, a key difference between my approach and accessibility and applicability effects is
that those two processes, according to Nelson et al. (1997a), function by activating information that
respondents’ already had at their disposal. In these conceptualizations the scope of framing effects is
somewhat narrow because the information provided in a frame has to make relevant considerations
accessible or applicable which requires some prior linkage in a respondent’s memory between the
information in the frame and the target attitude object. In contrast, ‘cognitive internalization’ is a process
that is most relevant for explaining responses on issues that respondents do not yet have information at
their disposal. Here, I argue that exposure to frames helps build that initial understanding of a new
attitude object which operates at a higher level of abstraction such that frame internalization guides
understanding beyond the domain specific frame that people were originally exposed to. For instance,
in contrast to Price et al. (1997), I am thus not interested in knowledge activation but in the process of
developing new knowledge structures that can subsequently be activated.
Importantly, I further proffer that ‘cognitive internalization’ is also distinct from the ‘belief content
change’ conception of framing. Framing in that conceptualization suggests that frames provide
information that changes the content of people’s beliefs about the specific issue at hand by “introduc[ing]
new considerations about a subject” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 116). In contrast, frames in the
‘cognitive internalization’ framework do notmerely alter considerations for the specific attitude object at
hand but rather they provide respondents with a ‘central organizing idea’ for the class of related objects.
Thus, the effect is much broader because it changes how people come to think about an entire class of
objects rather than a specific issue, thereby creating a new cognitive structure that provides a narrative
to understand novel information. This is not merely a semantic difference but it fundamentally changes
the expectations about the scope of framing effects by highlighting how information contained in frames
can foster attitude generalization (here again this dynamic distinguishes ‘cognitive internalization’ from
accessibility which also posits very domain specific effects).
Taken together then, the central idea is that exposure to frames allows people to incorporate
structural features of a frame, which then create initial belief structures that respondents subsequently
use to make sense of new issues. This leads to a general basic hypothesis:
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H1: People will internalize the central idea of a frame they are exposed to.
This hypothesis thus suggests that exposure to a frame leads to cognitive internalization, meaning
that people will retain aspects of the ‘central organizing idea’ of the frame in their memory. Moreover,
then, the degree to which people internalize a frame should mediate the relationship between the frame
and subsequent attitudinal outcomes. A second hypothesis is thus:
H2: Cognitive internalization can mediate the eect of a frame on subsequent attitude expression.
Here it is important to clarify that I amnot suggesting that this is the onlymechanism throughwhich
framing works, rather I am proposing that this is one way of thinking about the process. Moreover,
it is worth reiterating at this point that my argument differs from the accessibility (making certain
information more available), the applicability paradigms (making a certain consideration seem more
important/relevant), or the ‘belief content change’ paradigm (changing specific beliefs about the attitude
object). The key distinction is that I am not interested in the effect of a frame on an attitude expression
or evaluation but rather on subsequent sense making, which entails building a cognitive architecture
that people can use to extrapolate beyond the information they were exposed to. Thus, I suggest that
internalization can be causally prior to applicability or accessibility. Indeed, I think it would be consistent
with both schools of thought because residues of the frame in memory could make aspects of the frame
more applicable ormore accessible. This conceptualization goes a step further though, by suggesting that
frames may not simply affect the outcome but the way people come to think about the outcome. This
requires new measurement techniques that will be introduced in the next section.
measuring cognitive internalization
It is worth differentiating the general goal of measuring cognitive internalization from the empirical
strategyused in this specific case. Here, I seek toprovide an intuitiveunderstandingofhow internalization
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can be measured in general terms, after which I will introduce the specific design used in the present
empirical application at a later stage.
The general idea is to measure the extent to which people incorporate the narrative (or ‘central
organizing idea’) of a frame when thinking about information on an issue related to that frame - even
if that new information has no traces of the frame. For example, if people are constantly exposed to
news reports claiming that violence is predominantly perpetuated byAfricanAmericans then theymight,
when asked to describe a violent incident for which they were provided with no information about race,
nonetheless include race in their description of the event. That is, I am not simply saying that they might
be more likely to tick a box on a survey indicating the perpetrator belonged to a certain racial group but
they will, without being prompted, provide this information as part of their narrative of events. The
value-added of the open-ended prompt vis-á-vis the closed-ended prompt is that the former measures
understanding without providing any information thatmay prime associations (i.e. a question about the
race of the perpetrator would provide an additional prime).
This is the dynamic that cognitive internalization seeks to uncover. The measurement device I am
proposing can be implemented as part of any framing experiment. The key innovation in this design
lies in the measurement instrument administered as part of the post-test survey after respondents have
read a randomly assigned text framed in a certain way.1 In addition to the standard post-test questions
participants will also be directed to a vignette providing them with basic, bullet-point style information
related to the issue in question. This vignette, in essence, provides participants with the basic facts
surrounding an issue in the absence of any framing or narrative structure. Participants are then prompted
to write about the issue in a paragraph.
The prompt for this question, which takes on the form of an open-ended text box, simply asks
respondents to objectively describe the information presented in the bullet points in their own words.
Note here that I seek to elicit objective descriptions rather than evaluations in order to minimize
respondents seeking to rationalize their responses in linewith any pre-existing attitudes. The responses to
1It is assumed that this measurement strategy is administered within a standard survey instrument aimed at recording
traditional variables associated with attitude change that are needed to construct the dependent variables for the substantive
analysis.
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these open-ended items can then be coded to establishwhether peoplemake use of the ‘central organizing
idea’ that they were previously exposed to. In the racialized crime script example, this would look as
follows: People are randomly exposed to stories about crime that either use the racialized crime frame or
not. Then, later on in the survey they are exposed to bullet-pointed information about a different event
that states that there was an armed robbery at a certain location, that no-one was harmed, and that the
subject fled on foot. They are then asked to objectively describe this event in their own words. If they
have internalized a frame suggesting that there is a racial dimension to violent crime then they will be
more likely to make inferences about the race of the subjects in their descriptions.
This coding canbe donemanually or using automated approaches so as to tap into the central features
of each frame. The coding scheme can concentrate on both the way the paragraph is structured and
whether people make use of a certain narrative in their descriptions. If frames affect people because they
take on their narrative structure when making sense of new information, then this structure should be
visible in their write-ups of new information - even if that information was not itself presented in a way
that adopted a certain frame. In this application I will discuss different ways that open-ended responses
can be coded and validated, and introduce alternative measurement using closed-ended questions.
application: attitudes toward global private governance
I test the idea of cognitive internalization in two experimental studies that are substantively concerned
with citizens’ attitudes toward global private regulation. While previous work on supranational
governance arrangements has primarily focused on bodies such as the European Union (EU) that have
become politicized and are subject to public contestation (e.g. De Wilde and Zürn 2012), I explore
attitudes towards new forms of global governance in a different context, namely the realm of global
private regulators such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, these
two international private-sector bodies are removed from traditional democratic control yet account for
roughly 85 per cent of international product standards (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 5). While regulations
and standards pertaining to the size of transport containers or the substances in paints might sound
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trivial, these decisions have far-reaching consequences that can benefit some industries or countries at
the expense of others. For example, if a new standard size for container ships is adopted and this new
standard is the same as the existing one in a given country then businesses in that country would not
incur adaptation costs whereas those in other countries would. These organizations produce this large
body of standards through decision-making mechanisms that are quite distinct from the democratic,
participatory structures that are common in democratic nation-states. Here, expertise and efficiency are
often the focus of deliberation as opposed to input from public stakeholders (Benvenisti and Downs
2009).
Academic inquiry into such global private-sector regulation and standard setting is still in its infancy.
That said, it has already been suggested that standard-setting is an ‘inherently political activity’ that
has ‘considerable distributional implications’ (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 41; 220). While the substantive
question of what drives support for these organizations is the focus of Chapter 3 of this dissertation, here
I focus on the idea that framinghas the potential to structure howpeople think about these organizations.
Centrally, framing global standard-setting in terms of efficiency gains and the fact that their operations
can help businesses reduce waste should lead respondents to internalize such a narrative centering on
the role of these organizations in producing more efficient outcomes. In contrast, framing global
standard-setting in terms of their governance arrangements (i.e. technocratic committees as opposed to
elected governments) should lead respondents to internalize a narrative focusing on their independent
nature and their detachment from national politics. Thus, I suggest that exposure to frames focusing
on either ‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ will lead people to internalize two different understandings of
what these organizations are about. Importantly, I contend that ‘cognitive internalization’ can best be
measured when respondents are exposed to a new attitude object, thereby allowing frames to create an
initial belief structure about a class of attitude objects. Therefore, this substantive case provides a good
domain for testing this process as respondents are not likely to already have formed opinions about these
organizations. To reiterate, the argument here is not that simply that exposure to narratives employing an
‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ frame in discussions of a specific organization will affect solely attitudes about
that specific organization but rather that respondents will internalize these frames as cognitive structures
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to make sense of new governance organizations they encounter.
In terms of attitudinal outcomes, I am interested in how these frames affect respondents’ general
favorability toward non-governmental international bodies setting global standards, as well as their
perceptions of how legitimate and democratic these organizations are. While Chapter 3 provides both a
theoretical framework andmore comprehensive empirical analysis of these public opiniondynamics, here
I focus on simplified conjectures, namely that exposure to efficiency frames will lead to more favorable
attitudes toward these organizations, whereas exposure to governance frames should lead to less favorable
attitudes as well as beliefs that these bodies are illegitimate and undemocratic. The conjecture that the
governance frame should decrease support is based on the authority transfer literature and this question
will be central in subsequent chapters.
It isworthhighlighting that there aremultiple reasons to study cognitive internalization in the context
of global private regulatory governance. First, it is a real issue that can be covered in the news media.
Second, it is an issue that can be framed in a variety of ways, by focusing either on the efficiency of such
regulatory bodies or on the way in which its governance structures differ from traditional governments.
Third, it is an issue that has not garneredmuch public attention to date and therefore people are unlikely
to have deep pre-existing schemata to guide their thinking on the issue, thus limiting the role of frames
to move opinion (cf. Goodwin et al. 2018).
study 1
This section introduces a first single-shot experiment in which I seek to validate my cognitive
internalization measure. To test both whether a frame can become cognitively internalized and whether
differences in framing can affect attitudes toward global regulatory governance, I conducted a survey
experiment in March 2015. I recruited 375 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The sample
was 52% female and 58% of respondents identified as Democrats, 27% as Republicans, and 14% as
Independents. The mean age was 39 years and 60% of respondents had achieved at least a 2-year college
degree. While this is clearly not a representative sample, previous research has shown the suitability
of MTurk samples for political science experiments (e.g., Berinsky et al 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015).
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Furthermore, it has been shown that experimental effects generalize from the original sample to MTurk
samples (Coppock 2018). Thus, despite this study using a convenience sample, the expectation should be
that similar effects would be uncovered when moving to a more representative sample.
The survey included a between-subjects experiment in which respondents were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions (the full texts for the conditions can be found in the appendix). The
control condition consisted of a short text introducing the ISO, providing basic information about the
organization, its scope, and activities. While some framing experiments use a control condition on an
unrelated topic, the nature of the topic at hand requires that I generate a baseline for the attitudes I am
interested in, and it would be difficult to ask people their opinions on bodies that they can be expected
to know very little to nothing about.
The two competing frames I am interested in can be described as an ‘efficiency frame’ and a
‘governance frame’. These are frames that could feasibly be used to report on global regulatory bodies.
Indeed, mentions of regulatory bodies in the media often include descriptions of governance structures
(even the terms non-governmental and supranational convey such information) or their purported aims
of increasing efficiency. They also mirror the types of frames commonly encountered in reporting on
the EU. For both frames I use the same text as in the control condition but include an additional
paragraph emphasizing the frame. The ‘efficiency frame’ condition highlights some of the benefits of
global standardization by describing how international standards improve efficiency for businesses by
reducing cost andminimizing errors andwaste. Specifically, the baseline text about the ISO is augmented
with the following text: ‘This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently
because working with standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. It does so by minimizing
errors and waste, thus in turn increasing productivity.’
In contrast, the ‘governance frame’ condition highlights how the governance arrangements rely on
expert decision-making without interference from elected governments or pressure from public opinion.
Specifically, the baseline text about the ISO is augmented with the following text: ‘The governance
structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from elected governments or
pressure from the public. The standards thus exclusively represent the needs of experts and industry and do
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not take into account public opinion.’ 2
After reading the (randomly assigned) text all respondents were directed to the same task used to
measure cognitive internalization.3 They were told about the fact that the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) existed and provided with the following bullet point information:
• International, non-governmental standards organization
• Founded in 1906 with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland
• Made up of national standards committees
• Develops standards for all electronic and electrical technologies
• Examples: sizes of batteries or dimensions of audio CDs
Respondents were told that they should read this information carefully as they would be asked about
it later. On the subsequent screen they were then asked to respond to the following prompt in an
open-ended text box: “Based on the bullet points on the previous page, please try and objectively describe
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in a few sentences.” Here it is worth taking a
moment to reiterate how this measurement strategy differs from previous approaches that use ‘thought
listing’ tasks (e.g., Price et al. 1997; Berinsky and Kinder 2006). The key difference is that those studies
elicit thoughts regarding the frame that people were randomly exposed to whereas I, in contrast, have all
respondents elicit thoughts to the same information. Thus, in my case the task is not with reference to
the frame but with reference to new information and the expectation is that prior exposure to frames will
affect peoples’ responses.4
2Thenotionof not taking into account public opinionmight be considered a negative cue. This question is takenupmore
in subsequent chapters and it is worth noting that the vignettes in the second study are designed to overcome this limitation.
3There was no “back” button in the survey and thus respondents were not able to go back and read the vignette again
4It is worth emphasizing that the measurement in this study is not ideal as exposure to this task is directly preceded by
exposure to a frame. My second study addresses this limitation.
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Hand Coding
The first measurement of cognitive internalization relies on hand coding the open-ended responses. I
treat each open ended response as a unit of analysis and code for two variables, namely presence of the
‘efficiency frame’ and presence of the ‘governance frame’. The hand-coding measure was only coded by
the researcher and therefore the next two sections discuss alternative coding approaches used to validate
this coding.
Following from the experimental manipulations described above, I conceptualize any response that
explicitly describes the IEC with reference to its benefits for businesses and trade as well as discussions
of how standards can lower production costs, increase productivity or lower waste as having internalized
the ‘efficiency frame’. The coding scheme was holistic based on whether information in the responses
integrated content about efficiency or governance. The texts didnot have touse any specific keywords but
rather any response that included information about potential efficiency gains from standardization was
coded as having internalized the ‘efficiency frame’ (coded one if it did and zero otherwise). For instance,
if a respondent describes the IEC by stating that they set standards for batteries and that these standards
help increase businesses’ productivity by cutting waste then I take this as evidence of internalization.
I conceptualize any response that includes discussion of how the IEC’s governance arrangements
center around experts instead of elected governments as having internalized the ‘governance frame’.
Specifically, this includes any response that explicitly discusses how standards are the product of
decision-making that has no input fromelected bodies and are not linked to public opinion or democratic
pressure. Again, there arenonecessary keywords thatneed tobepresent as long as there is explicitmention
of no interference from democratically elected bodies or the public. Importantly, it does notmatter if the
respondent suggests whether this is a good or a bad thing in their mind, rather any mention is coded as
having internalized the ‘governance frame’ (again coded one if mentioned and zero otherwise).
These two measures of internalization thus capture whether respondents’ descriptions of the IEC
include aspects of the framed narrative they were exposed to in the text they read about the ISO. This
mirrors the theoretical construct of internalization as it measures whether respondents, without any
prompt to do so, incorporate central ideas from a frame in subsequent sense-making.
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Automated Coding
To examine the reliability and reproducability of the hand-coded measure, I complement the analyses
by also measuring internalization using an automated coding technique. Here, I use a dictionary-based
word count approach, which I implement using Lexicoder software (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2011).
The basic idea here is to create a dictionary with two sets of terms, corresponding to the the two frames.
The program then counts how many words associated with each frame exist in each response and based
on this count I code whether a response has internalized a frame or not.
I constructed the first dictionary based on a small number of terms that capture the essence of
the two frames, respectively. On the one hand, words associated with the ‘efficiency frame’ include all
variations of the word efficient, and words such as productivity, waste, cut, cost. On the other hand, words
associated with the ‘governance frame’ include governance, elected, public, opinion, democratic. Based on
the automated coding I then classify each response that includes at least one term associated with a frame
as having internalized that frame. It would thus be theoretically possible that a respondent internalized
both frames as these are measured separately (this also applies for the hand coded measure). Due to the
fact that a response using one term is coded as internalization, it is important to develop parsimonious
dictionaries that clearly map onto the theorized frame and do not include extraneous terms. The second
dictionary is a simple extension that includes a few additionalwords. For instance, the efficiencywords are
augmented with terms related to business and simplicity and the governance words are augmented with
words such as influence and control. The reason behind using two dictionaries is to be able to examine
the tradeoffs involved in adding additional words to the dictionary.
Validation using a Structural Topic Model
The two above procedures enable me to generate variables for each respondent indicating whether or
not they internalized the frame they were exposed to. However, the above measures invariably rely on
researcher input as the researcher conducts the coding (or devises a coding scheme for others to use) and
selects the words that are associated with each frame for the dictionary-based analyses. Therefore, as an
additional validity check, I also conduct a test that does not suffer from this issue. Specifically, I fit a
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Structural Topic Model (STM) (Roberts et al. 2014) to the open-ended responses and include a variable
for treatment assignment (Efficiency frame versus Governance frame) as a predictor of topic prevalence.
Tominimize researcher degrees-of-freedom, I do not pre-determine the number of topics to be returned
but rather allow an inbuilt algorithm tomake this selection given the data. While this procedure does not
produce an internalization measure for each individual respondent, I use it here merely to test whether
the model uncovers statistically significant differences in topic prevalence based on the treatment. And,
in so far as there are differences, I examine the words most exclusively associated with these topics as a
validation exercise.
Attitudinal Outcome Variables
I examine the effect of the frames on four outcomes: (1) general favorability to non-governmental bodies
setting international standards for products and services, (2) the perceived legitimacy of such bodies,
(3) the perceived democratic nature of these bodies, and (4) an additive index of the three preceding
variables (α = .75). The original variables are measured on 5-point Likert scales running from zero
(signifying strongly oppose/very illegitimate/very undemocratic) to one (signifying strongly favor/very
legitimate/very democratic). Thus, higher values on each variable denote more positive responses.
Substantive Results
First, I will very briefly introduce the substantive results from the first experiment. I am interested in
both differences between the efficiency and governance frames as well as differences between either of
these frames and the control condition.
Table 2.1: Study 1 - Substantive Results
Efficiency FrameMean Control Mean Governance FrameMean
Favorability 0.75 (.022) 0.75 (.021) 0.72 (.022)
Legitimacy 0.78 (.020) 0.77 (.021) 0.80 (.021)
Democracy 0.67 (.020) 0.66 (.023) 0.60 (.024)
Index 0.73 (.017) 0.73 (.019) 0.71 (.017)
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
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Examining Table 2.1, the first thing that becomes evident is that, across both the control condition
and the two treatment conditions, attitudes towards global regulatory bodies are rather positive. On
both the question of general favorability towards global regulatory bodies, their perceived legitimacy, as
well as the index there are no statistically significant differences between the governance and the efficiency
frame or between the control condition and either frame. On the first question the means hover around
0.75, substantively meaning that people are somewhat favorable towards these bodies. On the question
of legitimacy, results are similar just above 0.75 meaning that, overall, respondents articulated that they
perceived these bodies as somewhat legitimate.
The only significant experimental result is that compared to both respondents in the control
condition or the efficiency condition, respondents exposed to the governance frame were slightly more
likely to believe these bodies to be undemocratic. Specifically, themean in the governance framewas 0.60,
substantively close to “neither favor nor oppose” compared to 0.67 in the efficiency frame condition
(p<0.05) and 0.66 in the control condition (p<0.05). Thus, reading about the ISO framed in a way
to emphasize that the body is not responsive to democratically elected governments or public opinion
resulted in a less favorable evaluation in terms of their democratic nature, albeit still a relatively positive
or neutral one as opposed to an outright unfavorable evaluation.
It is worth taking a moment to discuss these results. Importantly, across the board there seems to be
widespread approval for the concept of global non-governmental bodies setting standards, even if it is
made clear that these standards are not subject to deliberation by elected governments or pressure from
the public. Respondents did not think that this type of governance is illegitimate and even being exposed
to information that clearly differentiates the governance mechanisms of these bodies from traditional
representative governance mechanisms, respondents only perceive them as slightly less democratic (and
it has no bearing on their evaluations of the bodies’ legitimacy or general approval). I focus on the
substantive question of what drives support for these organizations in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.
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Cognitive Internalization Results
Next, I turn to themainquestionof interest, namelywhether people drawon the frame theywere exposed
to when reading about the ISO in their open-ended responses describing the IEC. It is worth reiterating
here that respondents all read the same information about the IEC but that their objective descriptions
might differ depending on which text about the ISO they were previously exposed to. The fact that
these answers are in response to a prompt asking respondents to describe the organization as opposed to
providing an opinion facilitatesmeasurement of understanding. Thus, I suggest this is a very direct test of
cognitive internalization because it measures whether people draw on previously received (and framed)
information when thinking about related issues.
Table 2.2: Cognitive Internalization Results - Hand &Word Count Coding (Study 1)
Efficiency Frame Control Governance Frame
Hand Coding
Internalized Efficiency 0.13 (.03) 0.02 (.01) 0.01 (.01)
Internalized Governance 0 0.02 (.01) 0.09 (.03)
Dictionary Count ver. 1:
Internalized Efficiency 0.10 (.03) 0.01 (.01) 0
Internalized Governance 0 0 0.05 (.02)
Dictionary Count ver. 2:
Internalized Efficiency 0.16 (.03) 0.07 (.02) 0.02 (.01)
Internalized Governance 0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.01) 0.06 (.02)
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
The ‘cognitive internalization’ results using both a hand-coding procedure and two dictionary-based
word count procedures are presented in Table 2.2. I discuss these results in turn before examining the
relationship between the hand-coded measure of internalization and the measure based on automated
dictionary coding.
First, the top section of Table 2.2 shows the mean level of internalization based on hand coding of
responses where a one in the coding scheme denoted that the frame was internalized. Thus, we can
interpret these numbers as the percentage of respondents incorporating structure from the frame in their
descriptions. It shows that 13 percent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition described the IEC
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using language about efficiency orminimizing errors andwaste compared to only 2 percent in the control
condition (p<0.001) and 1 percent in the governance frame condition (p<0.001). An example of this kind
of response included the following text: “They do this in order for businesses to be more efficient so
they will reduce more waste.” Here the respondent thus provided information in their descriptions that
draws on information they read about the ISO previously. In contrast, 9 percent of respondents in the
governance framementioned lack of responsiveness to governments or the public compared to 0 percent
in the efficiency frame condition (p<0.001) and 2 percent in the control condition (p<0.05). An example
response internalizing the governance frame included the following: “it is non governmental and is made
up of experts and thus has no public opinion pressure.”
Second, the bottom two sections ofTable 2.2 replicate these results using the internalizationmeasures
derived from the two automated codings. The results look similar.5 For instance, we can see that 10
percent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition used words associated with the frame in their
responses compared to one percent in the control group (p<0.01) and zero percent in the governance
frame condition (p<0.001). Similarly, 5 percent of respondents in the governance frame condition used
words associated with the frame compared to 1 percent in the other two conditions (p<0.01).
There are a couple of ways to examine inter-coder reliability.6 First, it is worth noting that the percent
agreement in classification between the hand coded variables and the automated variables is always above
90% (ranging from 94% to 98% agreement). Second, comparing the hand-coding to the first dictionary
coding (using the more parsimonious dictionary) the Cohen’s Kappa statistic and the Krippendorff’s
alpha coefficients are both .65 for the efficiency frame internalization measure and both are .62 for the
governance frame internalization measure. For Cohen’s Kappa this counts as substantial agreement,
although the Krippendorff alpha measure is on the lower end (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007).
It is worth noting that the two dictionaries I used for the present analysis were based on a small
number of terms that I associate with the specific frames. Both dictionaries slightly increased the number
of cases falling into the efficiency frame (compared to the hand-coding procedure) but they had fewer
5Here I only discuss the results from themore parsimonious dictionary but it is worth noting that all differences I discuss
are also statistically significant at conventional levels using the augmented dictionary.
6Here I conceptualize the hand coded variable and the automated variables as different ‘coders’.
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cases falling into the governance frame. We can see that increasing the number of words had a greater
effect for the efficiency frame while not really increasing the number of cases falling into the governance
frame. It is of course possible to developmore extensive dictionaries in the future but suffice it to say that
even two small yet specialized dictionaries produce variables that look similar to the hand-coded variables
and produce substantively similar results. Increasing the words included in the dictionaries increases the
risk of misclassification.
In sum, these results suggest that a non-trivial number of respondents, when asked to objectively
describe an organization based on a couple of bullet points, incorporated information into their
descriptions that theyhadpickedup froma frame theywerepreviously exposed to. I believe this elucidates
a potentialmechanismunderlying framing effects such that people start understanding informationusing
a lens and this lens can be altered through framing.
The above results provide initial evidence that ‘cognitive internalization’ can be measured and that
some people explicitly draw on frames they were exposed to when describing a novel organization.
Next, I briefly examine the results from the STM procedure. The algorithm returned 33 topics, for
which the prevalence of six topics differed significantly (at p<0.05) between respondents in theEfficiency
frame condition and respondents in the Governance frame condition. Figure 2.1 plots this difference in
topic proportions for those topics alongside the ten words that represent each topic using simplified
frequency-exclusivity (FREX) scoring, which provide relatively intuitive representations of what each
topic is about.
The results inFigure 2.1 provide additional corroboration that respondents are internalizing the frame
they are exposed to. Estimates on the left side of the dashed line denote topics that are more prevalent
among respondents in the governance condition whereas estimates on the right hand side represent
topics that are more common among respondents in the efficiency condition. At first glance, we can see
that topics represented by words such as ‘government’, ‘independent’ or ‘interference’ are significantly
more likely to be found among respondents in the governance frame, whereas topics with words such
as ‘allow’, ‘uniform’ or ‘help’ are more likely among respondents in the efficiency frame. The intuitive
governance-related topics nicely complement the above findings while the topics that are more prevalent
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Figure 2.1: Study 1 - Difference in Topic Proportions
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study 2
The results from Study 1 provide initial support for the idea that people may be internalizing ‘frames in
communication’ such that they become ‘frames in thought’. However, I believe that internalization is a
process that develops over time with cumulative exposure to the same frame. Thus, while finding some
initial evidence in a single-shot experiment is encouraging, I am ultimately interested in the effects of
repeated exposure. Moreover, the ideal experimental designwould seek tomanipulate the internalization
mechanism to provide additional causal leverage. To address these shortfalls, I designed a second study.
This study augments the first experiment in a number of ways. First, the study consists of a three-wave
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panel design in which respondents are exposed to multiple treatment texts. Second, in the first two
waves I also include experimental manipulations seeking to facilitate cognitive internalization to provide
additional leverage on the mechanism. I describe the three waves in turn.
Wave 1: The first survey wave included attitudinal and demographic question batteries as well
as random assignment to stimuli about the ISO. The frames employed in this wave were amended
versions of those used in the first experiment (see Appendix for full stimuli). However, in addition to
the three framing conditions (i.e., control condition, efficiency frame condition, and governance frame
condition), there were two additional conditions. These two conditions included the same information
as the efficiency frame and governance frame conditions, but then augmented these conditions by asking
respondents to describe the organization in an open-ended text box. To be clear, this serves a different
purpose than the open-ended text box that will be used in the third wave. Specifically, this text box task
should facilitate internalization by increasing respondents’ cognitive engagement with the text whereas
the text box in the thirdwave (see below)will be used to assess internalization. Thesemanipulations were
thus developed following the implicit mediation analysis framework (Gerber and Green 2012: 333-336;
see also Archaya et al. 2018), in which treatments are crafted such as to provide leverage on the causal
mechanism. Here, the argument is that the task itself should facilitate internalization of the frame, and
thus respondents in these conditions should be even more likely to internalize the frame compared to
respondents in the basic framing conditions.
Wave 2: The procedure in the second wave mirrored that of the first. The key differences being
the nature of the attitudinal questions asked and, importantly, the topic of the stimuli. The topic of
the stimuli was the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is an organization that can
be categorized as belonging to the same class of organization as the ISO or the IEC even though it is
concerned with a very different domain of regulation, namely international accounting standards. The
idea behind this manipulation is thus to provide repeated exposure to the same frame respondents were
previously exposed to, while varying the information in a way that showcases the same type of regulatory
body operating in a very different domain. Respondents were assigned to the same five treatment
conditions from the first wave and treatment assignment was carried over. This means respondents were
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exposed to the same frame, and those respondentswhowere assigned to the initial writing taskwere again
asked to describe the organization they had read about.
Wave 3: The procedure in the third wave differed slightly from the preceding waves. First, there
was no writing task manipulation, meaning that there were only three framing conditions. The
organization introduced in the stimuli was the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private standard
setting organization that develops standards for non-financial disclosure relating to sustainability,
corruption, and human rights. Second, however, only half of the respondents were randomly assigned to
read about this organization. Thismanipulation provides additional leverage for the question ofwhether
‘cognitive internalization’ is not simply the product of priming. Before respondents were exposed to a
modified version of the IEC writing prompt used in Study 1, I included a distractor block consisting
of comprehensive need for cognition and need to evaluate question batteries. Thus, unlike the first
experiment, respondents did not complete this task directly after being exposed to the stimuli. It is
worth reiterating three design features that seek to strengthen the internal validity of the IEC writing
task. First, half of the respondents in the thirdwavewere not exposed to a treatment text in this wave thus
eliminating the possibility that any results among this subset were simply brought about by exposure to a
stimulus immediately prior (i.e. respondents in this condition were last exposed to a frame in the second
wave). Second, even for those respondents who were exposed to a stimulus in the third wave, there was
a distractor block intended to minimize such spillover effects. Third, the stimuli in the third wave were
about an organization that while considered a global private regulatory body, is active in a very different
domain than the IEC.
Measures
As in the first study, I leverage multiple ways of measuring ‘cognitive internalization’. I again use text
from open-ended responses following a prompt to objectively describe the IEC7 as the basis for the key
internalizationmeasures. First, Imeasure internalization using the same hand-coding procedure outlined
7The IEC task promptwas identical to the one used in the first studywith the exception that the term ‘non-governmental’
was deleted from the bullet-point description.
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previously. Second, I measure the concept using a similar dictionary-based word count procedure that
included key terms associated with the respective frames.8
Third, in addition to measuring cognitive internalization using the open-ended task, I also
subsequently asked respondents about the terms they associated with these types of organizations.
Specifically, the question read: “[W]e are interested in what terms you associate with global
standard-setting organizations. Please mark all words that you associate with these organizations.”
Respondents were presented with a list of nine terms of which three were associated with the efficiency
frame (namely efficiency, reduce costs, and productivity) and three were associated with the governance
frame (namely independent, non-governmental, and experts). I analyze this data using (1) two variables
measuring howmany ‘Efficiency’ or ‘Governance’ words respondents selected, respectively (each ranging
from zero to three words); and (2) a net measure for which I subtract the number of ‘Governance’ words
from the number of ‘Efficiency’ words (this variable ranges from negative three to positive three). These
measures thus provide a complement to the open-ended internalization measures.
Finally, attitudes toward global private regulatory governance in general wasmeasured using the same
three questions used in the first study, namely whether respondents favored or opposed such bodies,
whether they perceived them as legitimate, and whether they perceived them as democratic. I also again
combined these variables into an additive index (α = .74).
Sample
I recruited 1000US-based respondents throughMTurkPrime toparticipate in the firstwave of the study.9
These respondents were then re-contacted with invitations to participate in the second and third waves
after 24 and 48 hours, respectively. Given the nature of the subject pool, I purposely kept the repeated
exposure to a limited timeframe. This procedure yielded 776 respondents in wave 2 (78% re-contact rate)
and 743 respondents in wave 3 (75% re-contact rate). These rates are comparable to those observed in
8The governance frame dictionary consisted of the terms govern*, independen*, expert*, stakeholder*, academ* and the
efficiency frame dictionary consisted of the terms efficien*, cost*, trade, streamlin*, perform*, waste*, grow*, invest*, error, and
productivity
9Studies fielded through MTurk Prime rely on the Amazon MTurk crowd-worker subject pool but the Prime platform
provides additional features that make it more suitable for multi-wave studies (e.g., the ability to message workers with an
invitation to the follow-up waves).
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other panel studies usingMTurk subject pools (see Stoycheff 2016; Hall et al. 2018). Importantly, rates of
attrition did not vary by the experimental condition respondents were assigned to. That said, it is worth
noting that more highly educated respondents and older respondents were slightly less likely to attrite.
The wave one sample was 43% female and 22% non-white. The mean age was 38 years and 53% of
respondents had at least a college degree. In terms of party identification, 55% of respondents identified
as Democrats, 30% as Republicans, and 14% as Independents. While it is again worth acknowledging the
usual caveats of MTurk samples, it is also important to note that fielding such a three-wave panel study
on a more representative sample was not possible given the cost associated with panel studies.
Substantive Results
Before examining the internalization results, I again briefly turn to the substantive results of the framing
manipulation, which are presented in Table 2.3. These results largely mirror those of the first study such
that attitudes toward global regulatory organizations are rather positive. Although we again see some
variation based on the different dependent variables whereby the means are highest for the legitimacy
variable and lowest for the democracy variable. Turning to the question of whether these frames had any
effect on attitudes, it is first worth noting that there are no significant differences (at p<0.05) between the
control condition and either frame for any of the dependent variables. Indeed, even looking at differences
between the two frames there is only one comparison that yields a statistically significant comparison at
below the p<0.05 level: namely on the general favorability question, with respondents in the efficiency
frame condition being more favorably predisposed compared to respondents in the governance frame
condition. I further examined if there were heterogeneous effects based on whether or not respondents
were assigned to write about the stimuli they were exposed to in the prior waves but found none. Even
though there is limited evidence for traditional attitudinal framing effects, I next turn to examining
whether respondents cognitively internalized the frames they were exposed to.
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Table 2.3: Study 2 - Substantive Results
Efficiency FrameMean Control Mean Governance FrameMean
Favorability 0.83 (.013) 0.79 (.017) 0.79 (.012)
Legitimacy 0.84 (.013) 0.82 (.016) 0.81 (.014)
Democracy 0.67 (.014) 0.66 (.018) 0.65 (.013)
Index 0.78 (.011) 0.76 (.014) 0.75 (.011)
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
Internalization Results
Table 2.4 displays the means of the two frame internalization measures by experimental condition. First,
across both the hand-coded measure and the dictionary-based measure, only 2 percent of respondents in
the efficiency frame condition show signs of having internalized language associated with the efficiency
frame. Moreover, the level of efficiency frame internalization does not differ significantly between
experimental conditions at conventional levels of significance. In contrast, internalization of the
governance frame is somewhat stronger. Here, using both the hand coding and dictionary-based coding
reveals that 8 per cent of respondents in the governance condition internalized this frame compared to
only one percent in the efficiency frame condition (p<0.05). The difference between the governance
condition and the control condition is only significant when using the hand-coding measure, however.
Overall, while these results doprovide some evidence for frame internalization, it is important tonote that
the number of respondents classified as having internalized the frames is very low. Unfortunately, there is
thus too little variation in these variables to feasibly estimate effects conditional on whether respondents
were assigned to write about the organizations they were exposed to in the previous waves. That said, in
a later section, I conduct such tests using the word association proxy measures.
As a validity check, I again fit a structural topic model to the open-ended descriptions to examine
whether topic prevalence differed between those respondents assigned to the two substantive frames
using the same procedure outlined in Study 1. This model generated 38 topics, the prevalence of
seven of which differed significantly between respondents in the efficiency frame and governance frame
conditions. These results are presented in Figure 2.2. Examining the words associated with these
topics further substantiates the above findings. On the one hand, topics associated with words such as
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Table 2.4: Cognitive Internalization Results - Hand &Word Count Coding (Study 2)
Efficiency Frame Control Governance Frame
Hand Coding
Internalized Efficiency 0.02 (.008) 0.01 (.007) 0.00 (.003)
Internalized Governance 0.01 (.006) 0.01 (.009) 0.08 (.016)
Dictionary Count
Internalized Efficiency 0.02 (.008) 0.03 (.013) 0.01 (.007)
Internalized Governance 0.01 (.007) 0.05 (.019) 0.08 (.016)
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
‘independent’ and ‘govern’ are more frequently found among respondents assigned to the governance
frame thus providing further evidence that some respondents in the governance frame have internalized
the frame’s central organizing idea. On the other hand, while there are topics that are more prevalent
among respondents assigned to the efficiency frame, the words associated with these topics do not
intuitively correspond to words that are central to the efficiency frame. While the terms do appear to
focus more on the technical side of global private governance, this test does not provide any indication
that the topics are related to the core tenets of the efficiency frame. Thus, the results from the topicmodels
support the above findings that there is some evidence for internalization of the governance frame but
not for the efficiency frame.
The low degree of internalization of the efficiency frame raises an interesting measurement question.
While I have measured ‘cognitive internalization’ based on open-ended responses in which respondents
were asked to objectively describe the IEC, I also subsequently asked them how they felt about the
organization. Interestingly, using the same hand coding and dictionary count approaches as above shows
that 14 per cent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition express opinions that draw on language
from that frame compared to only 5-7 per cent of respondents in the control and governance frames. It is
thuspossible that thedescriptive open-endedprompt lends itselfmore tomeasuring internalizationof the
governance frame as information about governance arrangements can be consideredmore pertinent to an
effort to describe an organization compared to information about the likely benefits of the organizations.
The former is inherently more descriptive whereas the latter is more evaluative. Future work should thus
seek to refine how best to elicit respondents’ ‘frames in thought’ through open-ended questions.
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Figure 2.2: Study 2 - Difference in Topic Proportions
−0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04
Difference in Topic Proportions (Efficiency Frame vs. Governance Frame)
respons, includ, various,
big, field, limit, sort,
dedic, pertain, commis
decid, consum, global,
standardsguidelin, will,
design, agenc, board,
weight, mani
electr, develop,
regulatori, standard,
say, intern, deal, cover,
technolog, implement
independ, tech, certain,
group, applic, sustain,
aim, oper, univers,
electricalelectron
publish, prepar, relat,
organ, everyon, report,
anyth, inform, lead,
intern
etc, differ, overse,
establish, govern,
affili, deal, player,
aim, agenc
dimens, new, audio,
cover, dedic, sinc, can,
compon, aim, instanc
Word Associations
The above results provide initial evidence for the idea that at least some respondents are internalizing
the ‘central organizing idea’ of frames they are exposed to. That said, the open-ended measurement
strategy produced very limited variation for the internalization concept, making it difficult to estimate
how exposure to frames affects internalization. Therefore, I also rely on a closed-ended approach by
leveraging the words people associated with these organizations. As previously noted, three terms were
associated with the efficiency frame (namely efficiency, reduce costs, and productivity) and three were
associated with the governance frame (namely independent, non-governmental, and experts).
Using this proxy measure, in Table 2.5 I examine how exposure to frames as well as the interaction
between frame exposure and the writing manipulation aimed at facilitating internalization affect which
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Table 2.5: PredictingWord Associations
Efficiency Efficiency Governance Governance E-G E-G
Words Words Words Words Words Words
Control -0.451∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.463∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.098) (0.135)
Governance -0.416∗∗∗ -0.248∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ -0.939∗∗∗ -0.663∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.118) (0.080) (0.112) (0.110) (0.152)
Internalization Task 0.042 -0.124 0.166
(0.122) (0.116) (0.157)
Governance X Task -0.348∗ 0.222 -0.570∗∗
(0.170) (0.162) (0.220)
Constant 1.928∗∗∗ 1.908∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.084) (0.057) (0.080) (0.079) (0.108)
N 743 594 743 594 743 594
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
words respondents associate with global private governance organizations. The dependent variable in the
first two columns is the number of ‘Efficiency’ words a respondent selected, in columns 3 and 4 it is the
number of ‘Governance’ words selected, and in columns 5 and 6 it is the net measure (‘Efficiency’ words
minus ‘Governance’ words). Here, the ‘Efficiency’ condition is the baseline condition because the main
comparison is between that condition and the ‘Governance’ condition as it allows testing of whether
these two frames lead to distinct associations.
Theunconditional results show that exposure to a frame increases the number ofwords related to said
frame that respondents associate with private global regulatory governance. For instance, respondents in
the governance condition selected 0.42 fewer efficiencywords and 0.52more governancewords compared
to respondents in the efficiency condition. Additionally, in two of the three conditional analyses we
see that this relationship is even stronger for those respondents who were assigned to the task aimed
at facilitating internalization. This finding provides additional evidence in support of the cognitive
internalization hypothesis given that this moderation model is suggestive of implicit mediation (i.e. the
effect is stronger in the condition that was explicitly developed to facilitate internalization).
One concern with these results is that they may be driven by respondents who were exposed to a
stimulus in the third wave and thus simple priming is leading to the result. However, in Appendix Table
2.6 I replicate these findings when restricting the sample to only those respondents whowere not exposed
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to a stimulus in the third wave. These results, for example, show that respondents in the governance
condition selected 0.35 fewer efficiency words and 0.38more governance words compared to respondents
in the efficiency conditionwhen the samplewas restricted. This, I suggest, strengthens the case that frames
have the ability to affect the structure of people’s understanding, rather than simply operating through
a priming dynamic. Indeed, the fact that these results replicate for the subset of respondents who were
not exposed to a stimulus in the third wave indicates that these associations have at least to some extent
become internalized.10
Cognitive Internalization as a Mediator
The above results, in combination with those from the first study, provide some support for my first
hypothesis, namely that respondents internalize the frame they were exposed to. I now briefly turn
to the second hypothesis which stated that cognitive internalization can mediate the effect of a frame
on attitude change. In the current case we are thus interested in whether internalization mediates
the statistically significant difference between the efficiency frame condition and the governance frame
condition in support for global private governance. As noted above, the internalization measures based
on the open-ended responses exhibit too little variation to reliably test this hypothesis. However, I
nonetheless conduct a preliminary test using the word association measure described above as a proxy
for internalization. In particular, I use the net measure in which the number of ‘Governance’ words a
respondent selected is subtracted from the number of ‘Efficiency’ words they selected.
I can then examine whether this proxy measure mediates the difference in favorability. Here, I
estimate an average causal mediation effect (ACME) using the causal mediation framework introduced
by Imai and colleagues (Imai et al. 2010ab; 2011).11 That is, I examine the expected difference in support
for global standardization bodies when internalization (the mediator) takes on the value associated with
the governance frame as opposed to the efficiency frame while holding frame exposure constant. In brief
10It is worth noting that one drawback of the ‘word association task’ as currently implemented is that the words included
in the taskwere words found in the vignettes. To strengthen this design, future applications should rely on synonyms to lessen
the possibility that respondents are merely remembering words rather than internalization the frame.
11It isworth noting that both the outcomemodel and themediatormodel are linearwhichmeans that the results produced
using this approach will produce equivalent results to mediation approaches using the product of coefficients method
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I am thus examining the extent to which the effect of the treatment (exposure to a frame) is mediated
through respondents’ frame internalization (measured using the word association proxy).
Figure 2.3: Mediation Results
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The results of this mediation analysis are presented in Figure 2.3. First, it is worth noting that there
is an indirect effect of the word association internalization proxy (ACME=-0.02; p<0.01) on favorability
toward global private governance organization. The implication is that, to the extent that exposure to
the governance frame as opposed to the efficiency frame made respondents less likely to associate these
organizations with efficiency words (i.e. a higher internalization of the governance frame as opposed to
the efficiency frame), this led to reduced support. Indeed, once themediator is accounted for in themodel,
the treatment itself has no statistically significant direct effect on the outcome, which is denoted in the
Figure by the insignificant average direct effect (ADE). Moreover, the specified mechanism accounts for
41
62 percent of the total effect.
These results thus suggest that the word associations that I consider proxies for internalization
mediate the relationship between being exposed to a frame and support for global private governance.
While not a direct test of internalization, these results are consistent with the idea that frames can lead
people to incorporate information into their own narratives and that these internalizations, in turn, can
affect their attitudes.12 Moreover, it is worth noting that I also ran the same mediation model with
an interaction term for whether respondents were assigned to the writing conditions in the first two
waves (i.e. the manipulation intended to facilitate internalization). However, there were no significant
differences in the estimated ACMEs between these two types of respondents.
conclusion
Against thebackdropof recent critiques of the ‘framing effects’ literature (e.g., Scheufele and Iyengar 2012;
Cacciatore et al. 2016; Leeper and Slothuus 2017), this chapter set out to make the case for the usefulness
of the framing concept. I suggested shifting the focus of inquiry from ‘attitudes’ to ‘understanding’ and
to leverage the framing concept to test whether exposure to frames affects the way in which people make
sense of the political world. In particular, drawing on early conceptualizations of frames as providing a
‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson andModigliani 1987), I proffered thatwhat distinguishes framing from
relatedmedia effects concepts is the leverage it proves for studying how ‘frames in communication’ shape
peoples’ ‘frames in thought’ in a structural manner that goes beyond simple accessibility, applicability, or
‘belief change’ effects.
I introduced the notion of ‘cognitive internalization’ as a way of conceptualizing and measuring
when people draw on frames they were previously exposed to when encountering new information.
Importantly, I suggested that this conceptualization goes beyond previous approaches based on the
breadth of the effect. Here, I suggested that the internalization of frames enables people to abstract away
12It is worth noting that the results presented here can also be replicated with data from the first study. In that study
I measured perceptions of what the focus of the text respondents read was using one question on how much it focused on
efficiency and one question on howmuch it focused on governance arrangements. Combining this variable in a similar fashion
to the word association variable shows that the statistically significant difference in attitudes about the democratic nature of
these bodies in that study is similarly mediated by that internalization proxy.
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from information they are exposed to larger classes of objects. Thus, the effect is not as narrow (and
object specific) as previous frameworks suggests but rather exposure to frames can alter the considerations
people bring to bear on issues that are more far-reaching than the actual domain of the frame they were
exposed to. This concept can be measured through open-ended survey prompts that ask respondents to
objectively describe information. Across two studies, I found initial evidence that somepeople internalize
central ideas of frames and thenuse this information in subsequent sense-making. Moreover, I uncovered
initial suggestive evidence that frame internalization canmediate the effect of frame exposure on attitudes.
While this chapter introduced ‘cognitive internalization’ and provided initial evidence for this
dynamic, a lot more work is needed in this area. I agree with recent critiques of the framing effects
literature that highlighted the lack of attention to the psychological mechanisms underlying framing
effects. Not every media effect or attitude change brought about by provision of information should
be classified as a framing effect. The framing concept is uniquely suited to the examination of how
repeated exposure to frames in communication structurally affect peoples’ frames in thought as well as
their attitudes. Here, future scholarship is needed to refine and test how cognitive internalization can be
measured.
One fruitful avenue for future researchwould be to test alternative ways ofmeasuring internalization
— and in particular the breadth of abstraction — through more direct, closed-ended questions. For
instance, after exposure to frames respondents could be presented with novel information on an issue
for which the frame they have ‘cognitive internalized’ should be applicable. Here, respondents could be
explicitly asked about how they conceptualize the issue (e.g., what they think themain conflict dimension
is or what class of issue the text they read about is an example of). If respondents have internalized the
frame then they should choose a framework consistent with the frame they were previously exposed to
even if the topic is distinct. Relatedly, it would be good to examine scope conditions of such attitude
generalization by testing how far-reaching these effects are. For instance, the text people respond to in the
internalization task could be made increasingly abstract. In the current example this could entail moving
from specific global governance organizations to regulatory agencies or bureaucracy more broadly such
that people are asked to write about bureaucracy in the US and if they adopt the efficiency or governance
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frame in their descriptions this would provide evidence of abstraction. Moreover, it has to be noted that
all tests of ‘cognitive internalization’ thus far have relied on the same issue (global private governance) and
two competing frames (efficiency vs governance). Future work is needed to expand this to other domains
with more clearly established existing competing frames.
In sum, I posit that cognitive internalization provides a mechanism for understanding the structural
component that underlies framing effects, thereby clearly elaborating framing beyond a simple
accessibility, applicability or ‘belief content change’ effect. Specifically, exposure to framesmaynot simply
have an immediate impact but rather will affect people’s basic understanding of novel political issues.
This provides us with a clearer picture of how consistently repeated frames can fundamentally affect how
citizens come to understand political issues.
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appendix
Stimulus Materials for Study 1
Control Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose
membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees
consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted
on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials,
products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard
dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.
Efficiency Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose
membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees
consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted
on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials,
products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard
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dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.
This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently because working with
standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. It does so by minimizing errors and waste, thus
in turn increasing productivity.
Governance Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose
membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees
consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted
on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials,
products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard
dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.
The governance structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from
elected governments or pressure from the public. The standards thus exclusively represent the needs of
experts and industry and do not take into account public opinion.
Stimulus Materials for Study 2
Wave 1: Control Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is an organization whose membership is
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made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 committees who are taskedwith developing ISO standards. These committees negotiate draft
standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines for a variety of materials,
products or services. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or
screw threads.
Wave 1: Efficiency Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is an organization whose membership is
made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 committees who are taskedwith developing ISO standards. These committees negotiate draft
standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials,
products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard
dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.
This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently because working
with standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. These efficiency gains are the result of
minimizing errors and waste, thereby increasing productivity.
Wave 1: Governance Condition
The International Organization for Standardization
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in
Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose
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membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.
The organization’s primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists
of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees
consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted
on by the ISOmembership.
These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines for a variety of materials,
products or services. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or
screw threads.
The governance structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from
elected national governments. The standards thus represent the needs of experts and industry and are
not voted upon by national governments.
Wave 2: Control Condition
The International Accounting Standards Board
The InternationalAccounting StandardsBoard (IASB),which is based inLondon, is an international
accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible for developing accounting
standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The board’s primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new
interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for
companies’ bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.
These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are
becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.
Wave 2: Efficiency Condition
The International Accounting Standards Board
The InternationalAccounting StandardsBoard (IASB),which is based inLondon, is an international
accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible for developing accounting
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standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The board’s primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new
interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for
companies’ bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.
These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are
becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.
Such common accounting standards reduce costs for businesses and increase efficiency as companies
operating in multiple countries can produce one set of financial reports rather than having to waste
resources producing separate reports for each country. Common rules also help potential investors by
increasing comparability of financial information.
Wave 2: Governance Condition
The International Accounting Standards Board
The InternationalAccounting StandardsBoard (IASB),which is based inLondon, is an international
private non-governmental accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible
for developing accounting standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The board consists of an independent group of experts drawn from industry and academia. Its
members have a range of experiences including setting standards as well as preparing, auditing and using
financial reports. While countries can sign up to adopt these standards, national governments have no
direct influence in the development of standards.
The board’s primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new
interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for
companies’ bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.
These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are
becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.
Wave 3: Control Condition
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The Global Reporting Initiative
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international standards organization that was founded
in 1997 and has its headquarters in Amsterdam.
The organization is responsible for the world’s first and most widely adopted global sustainability
standards, which provide companies across the globe with a common language for understanding and
disclosing non-financial information.
In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand
as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights,
corruption, and climate change.
Wave 3: Efficiency Condition
The Global Reporting Initiative
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international standards organization that was founded
in 1997 and has its headquarters in Amsterdam.
The organization is responsible for the world’s first and most widely adopted global sustainability
standards, which provide companies across the globe with a common language for understanding and
disclosing non-financial information.
In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand
as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights,
corruption, and climate change.
Such non-financial reporting can increase companies’ efficiency and reduce costs by streamlining
decision-making processes, improving operational performance, reducing waste, and highlighting new
growth and investment opportunities.
Wave 3: Governance Condition
The Global Reporting Initiative
TheGlobalReporting Initiative (GRI) is an international, non-governmental standards organization
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that was founded in 1997 and has its headquarters in Amsterdam.
The GRI is independent from national governments and its governance combines technical experts
and diverse stakeholders from four main constituencies: civil society organizations, business, labor, and
mediating institutions.
The organization is responsible for the world’s first and most widely adopted global sustainability
standards, which provide companies across the globe with a common language for understanding and
disclosing non-financial information.
In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand
as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights,
corruption, and climate change.
Additional Tables
Table 2.6: Internalization among Respondents who read no text in Wave 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Efficiency Efficiency Governance Governance Eff-Gov Eff-Gov
Control -0.400∗∗ -0.088 -0.312
(0.1487) (0.1414) (0.1940)
Governance -0.345∗∗ -0.118 0.380∗∗ 0.216 -0.725∗∗∗ -0.334
(0.1230) (0.1638) (0.1169) (0.1572) (0.1604) (0.2128)
Internalization Task 0.059 -0.434∗ 0.493∗
(0.1759) (0.1689) (0.2285)
Governance X Task -0.507∗ 0.352 -0.860∗∗
(0.2431) (0.2334) (0.3158)
Constant 1.886∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 1.451∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗
(0.0891) (0.1196) (0.0847) (0.1148) (0.1163) (0.1554)
N 352 278 352 278 352 278
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Chapter 3
Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of Global Private Environmental Governance
introduction
The rise of private authority in global environmental governance has received considerable scholarly
attention in political science and international relations (e.g. Cutler et al. 1999; Green 2014). Institutions
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) perform important tasks overcoming collective action problems but have also been shown to
produce environmental regulations with apparent distributive consequences (Clapp 1998; Büthe and
Mattli 2011). It has also been noted that these bodies’ decision-making organs can easily be captured by
industry interests and that the private good and the public good are not necessarily equivalent (Lipschutz
and Vogel 2002; Taylor 2005). Hence, a central question in this line of research asks: how legitimate are
the institutions involved in this new system of polycentric governance? This question has led scholars
to scrutinize these new governance actors with regards to their design and performance on a number of
dimensions, including their compatibility with the ideals of deliberative democracy and the openness of
their participatory structures.
While this normative debate is undoubtedly of importance to scholars and practitioners alike, this
paper seeks to expand the locus of inquiry by stressing the need to consider sociological legitimacy, that
is whether the public perceive the organizations as legitimate. To date, we know little about the public as
a legitimating audience and whether there is public support for bodies such as the ISO and the FSC.
My research begins with a basic description of public attitudes toward global private environmental
governance. More specifically, what are people’s attitudes about organizations such as the ISO and
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the FSC developing global environmental standards? Do they perceive these bodies as legitimate? As
democratic? And furthermore, what factors shape public attitudes toward the ISO, the FSC, and
polycentric environmental governance more broadly? To address these questions, I first draw on lessons
from the trajectory of public opinion toward the European Union (EU). I contend that private actors
now play a significant role in global environmental governance, yet the critiques about their legitimacy
have by and large been confined to the academy. Thus, bodies such as the ISO and the FSC are not
politically contested in the public domain. Consequently, wehave not paidmuch attention to the public’s
attitudes toward these bodies and their implications for legitimation. But the example of the EU shows
how public opinion can suddenly become crucial to the survival and effectiveness of actors involved in
global governance once these bodies become politicized.
Acknowledging that public opinion matters invariably leads to the question of what might drive
public opposition. I suggest that there are two conflicting hypotheses as to why these bodies become
politicized. On the one hand, a popular theoretical framework implies that global non-governmental
actors will become contested by the public when it recognizes how much authority these organizations
wield despite not being beholden to traditional democratic control. On the other hand, I hypothesize
that the public does not hold such sincere preferences and that public backlash occurs when national
elites frame this same information by adding affective tags suggesting that these bodies are undemocratic
and illegitimate. Importantly, departing from traditional partisan resistance (Zaller 1992) or motivated
reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013) accounts, my argument contends that people will be receptive to
these messages irrespective of the partisan identity of the elite. Adjudicating between these competing
conjectures will help shed light on how public opinion might affect the legitimation of global private
environmental governance. The purpose of the empirical analyses in this paper is thus threefold. First,
I am interested in examining the extent to which people support bodies such as the ISO and the FSC
and whether they perceive them as legitimate actors in global environmental governance. Second, I
am interested in whether it is basic information about the bodies’ governance arrangements or frames
highlighting a potential democratic/legitimacy deficit that alter support and perceptions. Third, I seek
to identify other correlates of this support.
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The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly introduce the literature on the legitimacy of global
private environmental governance. Second, I outline the importance of studying public opinion vis-à-vis
bodies such as the ISO and the FSC and discuss hypotheses for what drives support or opposition
toward them. Third, I present experimental designs that aim to measure attitudes toward global private
environmental governance whilst overcoming concerns about asking survey respondents questions on
organizations theymay have never heard of. Fourth, I examine public support for such organizations and
leverage two survey experiments to test my core hypotheses. Fifth, I further unpack the demographic and
socio-political correlates of said support. Sixth, in conclusion, I discuss the implications of the findings
for the larger literature on legitimacy of global governance.
the legitimacy of global private environmental governance
The emergence of polycentric governance in global environmental regulation has led to the creation of
a number of diverse private bodies that share an important characteristic: their roles are not prescribed
or mandated by law (Black 2008). Nonetheless, they develop impactful rules and regulations through
non-governmental channels that often lack traditional democratic public participatory structures (Davis
2012) leading them to sometimes be labelled as non-state market-driven governance systems (Cashore
2002). Organizations that can be categorized in this manner come in a variety of forms but generally
they develop and implement standards and rules through the involvement of multiple stakeholders
and often have a membership-based character such that they are composed of representatives from
national standard-setting organizations. Importantly, the rules and standards that such bodies develop
and implement can have significant distributive consequences (Clapp 1998; more generally see Büthe and
Mattli 2011; Nölke and Perry 2007). Unsurprisingly, this has led to scholarly interest in the legitimacy of
such forms of governance.
The scholarly debate on the legitimacy of such bodies can broadly be divided into two strands, one
normative and one empirical or sociological in nature (cf. Schleifer 2015). Scholars in the normative
tradition focus on delineating the characteristics that an organization ought to have in order to be
considered legitimate (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Here, institutions are evaluated on whether they
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adhere to some commonly embraced ideal, such as deliberative democracy (Steffek 2003; Bäckstrand
2006; Bäckstrand et al. 2010; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). By contrast, sociological or empirical
legitimacy is attained when an organization’s audience believes it has the right to rule (Buchanan
and Keohane 2006). Of course, there are intersections between these two debates as well (see for
instance Quack 2010). For example, some research has shown that transparency can increase perceptions
of legitimacy if the underlying decision-making structures it shines light on approximate notions of
deliberative democracy (De Fine Licht 2014). Thus, there is a belief embedded in conceptions of
deliberative democracy, for instance, that sociological legitimacy can follow from normative legitimacy.
Some observers have claimed that global private environmental bodies do relatively better in terms of
deliberative democracy than traditional global governance organizations. Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009:
733) for instance contend that:
“transnational rule-making organizations capitalize on the current legitimacy crisis
of intergovernmental organizations. By putting a strong emphasis on values such as
inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and deliberativeness, they portray themselves
as approaching the normative ideal of global governance organizations more closely than
actual intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund.”
However, the central concern in this paper is not whether bodies such as the ISO or the FSC are
legitimate in terms of achieving a normative ideal akin to deliberative democracy, but rather whether they
are considered legitimate by the public. This stands in contrast to the extant empirical literature that has
traditionally focused on whether organizations are considered legitimate by those most directly affected
such as individual firms, entire industries or interest groups (cf. Bernstein 2011; Bernstein and Cashore
2007; Cashore 2002; Schleifer and Bloomfield 2015; Falkner 2003).
The notion of the audience of global private environmental governance is crucial here. It makes
a difference if one is focusing on whether actors are legitimate because states or other international
organizations adopt their rules or whether firms do, for instance. Scholars have rightly pointed out
that the legitimacy requirements will vary over time as audiences change (Bernstein 2011; Bernstein and
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Cashore 2007). Indeed, the audiences in most of these cases are still emerging, and as audiences increase
in variety and number, disagreement over legitimacy will inevitably grow (Bexell 2014; Quack 2010).
the importance of studying public opinion
The preceding section ended by highlighting the role of ‘audience’ for legitimacy in the empirical or
sociological sense. The lack of a global ‘public’ has always posed a problem for legitimacy in global
governance and thus the audience for which legitimation is construed is usually not the general public
but rathermore proximate actors such asNGOs, firms or specific industries (cf. Bernstein 2011; Bernstein
and Cashore 2007).
Against this backdrop, I posit that a comprehensive empirical assessment of sociological legitimacy
needs to include consideration of both public support for the organizations or system in question and
public perceptions of their legitimacy. Factoring in public opinion dynamics is best motivated by an
examination of the trajectory of public support for the EU. Prior to the 1990s, public opinion toward
the EUwas characterized as dormant and inconsequential, mainly because the EU could, at this stage, be
characterized as “structurally condemned to inspire apathy” (Menon 2008: 220). Thiswas due to its focus
on supranational regulation and low political contestation among mainstream national political elites,
which facilitated a period of ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; see also Hooghe and
Marks 2005; 2009)when eliteswere able to advanceEuropean integrationwithout payingmuch attention
to the public and support was considered a fair-weather phenomenon (Hix 2008). Thus, public opinion
was not consequential for elites’ assessments of the Union’s legitimacy.
Times have radically changed. Nowadays, the EU is in an era of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and
Marks 2005) where elites cannot afford to ignore public opinion. Moreover, public opinion has become
polarized and is central to debates regarding the Union’s legitimacy. Explanations for the rise of public
opposition differ and often include economic considerations, identity-based explanations, or the types
of institutional considerations that will be discussed below. But what does the rise in public contestation
over the EU have to do with the legitimacy of global private environmental governance? Clearly, the ISO
and the FSC are quite distinct in institutional design and scope from the EU. For example, they are not
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formalized intergovernmental structures and their scope is a lot more specialized. More importantly, at
this point, the ISO and FSC are still largely uncontested in the broader public domain.
However, the same argument about an absence of public contestation was made regarding the EU
in the 1970s (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In both cases, the public was not directly involved in the
creation of these organizations and legitimacy was conferred either formally or informally through the
consent of national governments. The early academic debate surrounding the EU’s normative legitimacy
was uncannily similar to the current discourse on the legitimacy of global private governance. For
instance, there were extensive discussions regarding legitimation based on sound institutional features
(i.e. input legitimacy) or assessments of organizational performance (i.e. output legitimacy) (Scharpf
1999). Thus, if private environmental governance organizations follow the same trajectory as the EU,
they are likely to face more public opposition in the future. The question, then, is what happened in the
EU case and what lessons can be learned from it for the present purpose? While a full discussion of the
causes and consequences of declining public support for the EU is beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g.,
Hooghe and Marks 2005), two potentially competing arguments should be considered: the authority
transfer hypothesis now prevalent in the ‘EU politicization’ literature (e.g., De Wilde and Zürn 2012;
Statham and Trenz 2015) and the elite framing perspective (cf. Hooghe andMarks 2005; 2009).
On the one hand, some scholars have recently sought to expand the study of public opinion dynamics
vis-à-vis supranational or transnational organizations by shifting the focus from the sui generis experience
of Euroscepticism to the more broadly applicable concept of ‘politicization’ (e.g., Zürn 2014). For the
purposes of this dissertation, I conceptualize politicization to mean when an issue becomes contested in
the public domain and people believe that it should be subject to public deliberation. The case of the EU
illustrates such a shift when the public rejected the notion that the organization was solely a positive
sum endeavor and thus sought public deliberation on the issue given the sense that the EU’s actions
produced winners and losers. The idea then is to examine how bodies involved in global governance
become politically contested. A central hypothesis in this line of work posits that the public will seek
public contestation over these bodies once it notices that substantial authority has been transferred from
the nation-state to global organizations. Hence, the ‘authority transfer hypothesis’ insists that the public
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has sincere preferences over the legitimate locus of political authority. The implication of this authority
transfer hypothesis is that bodies such as the ISO and the FSCwill inevitably become politicized, which in
turnwill raise new questions about their democratic and participatory credentials as well their legitimacy.
Thus, the authority transfer line of argument thus leads to the following conjecture:
H1: Information about supranational organizations’ authority and decision-making structure
will decrease support for these organizations and increase perceptions that they are illegitimate and
undemocratic.
On the other hand, Hooghe and Marks’ (2005; 2009) influential ‘Postfunctionalist’ theory of
European integration posits that political entrepreneurs played a central role inmobilizing public tension
toward the EU. Their argument implies that people may not have had strong opinions either way about
European integration — as opposed to rejecting any supranational authority on sincere grounds — but
that political elites stoked rising antipathy toward the Union for political gain.
On the other hand, evidence suggests citizens do not universally reject expert or industry-involved
decision-making in favor of popular democratic arrangements (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s (2002) find, contrary to the popularized view of citizens as eager to be
more involved in politics, Americans are quite content for non-democratic actors to be involved in
policy-making and implementation. Citizens often yearn for more efficient policy-making, including
business and expert involvement instead of the traditional partisan conflict they have become accustomed
to at the national level (see alsoVanderMolen 2017). Subsequent research has also found some support for
these StealthDemocracy attitudes in Europe (Bengtsson andMattila 2009;Webb 2013; Coffé andMichels
2014).
Thus, drawing on the insights from Stealth Democracy and Hooghe and Marks’ (2009)
postfunctionalist theory leads me to posit a very different expectation about the trajectory of public
support toward global private environmental governance. Here, the public might indeed be positively
predisposed toward bodies such as the ISO or the FSC, yet such support could easily be undermined
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if people are exposed to frames suggesting they are undemocratic or illegitimate. Thus, people, when
exposed to the same information about institutional arrangements discussed above, will decrease support
not based on this information but because of the affective tags provided by elites, which suggest that the
organizations are undemocratic or illegitimate. Moreover, these cues can come from any domestic elite
because the purported conflict is between the domestic and the supranational level rather than between
partisan factions, which should reduce partisan motivated reasoning or partisan resistance. In sum, I
thus hypothesize:
H2: Elite frames claiming the existence of a democratic or legitimacy deficit will decrease support for
these organizations and increase perceptions that they are illegitimate and undemocratic.
Besides these expectations about how different information will affect attitudes, there are
individual-level differences that should be associated with higher levels of support. Centrally, the
Stealth Democracy rationale suggests:
H3: Respondents who support expert and industry involvement in decision-making will have more
favorable attitudes toward these organizations and perceive them as more legitimate.
Before examining attitudes toward global private environmental governance an important question
must be addressed: do people know enough about the institutions involved to have formed opinions?
This raises the question of measuring non-attitudes: simply asking survey respondents their opinions of
the ISO and the FSC could yield unstable or even invalid results given that these bodies do not enjoy
widespread public recognition.
An illustration of this problem can be found in YouGov’s 2012 Voice of the People survey in which
respondents were asked whether they had a positive, negative, or neutral opinion of the ISO or whether
they had never heard of the organization. Across all the countries in the study, 54% of respondents
articulated that they did not hold an opinion regarding the ISO and of those who held opinions, 45% said
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they were neutral, 47% were positive, and only 9% were negative. While this might imply the public is
favorably disposed toward the ISO, a clear majority of respondents either have no opinion or are neutral.
This is a situation in which political elites have tremendous potential to influence policy opinion on a
large scale: they simply need to supply an affective cue and many citizens will pick it up.
This state of affairsmust not deter us from studying these institutions because they do such important
and consequential work, and precisely because political elites have the power to generate popular support
or opposition. Still, we need to be careful in our measurement of attitudes about these organizations.
The next section outlines an experimental survey design that seeks to overcome the problems involved in
asking survey respondents about organizations they may not have heard of. The key here is to provide
respondents with sufficient information about the organizations in a baseline condition and then to
compare responses in that condition with responses to information that was explicitly developed to
operationalize the competing hypotheses.
To test these hypotheses, I conducted two experiments embedded in original surveys, which I will
discuss in turn in subsequent sections. Then I will turn to broader observational analyses examining the
correlates of support for private environmental governance using data both from studies.
study 1
Sample
The first studywas fielded inApril, 2016 using respondents (n=503) recruited through the crowdsourcing
platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The survey was restricted to U.S.-based adults, yielding
a convenience sample that was 43% female, 17% non-White, and 20% Republican (48% Independent
and 32% Democrat). Previous research has validated MTurk as a subject pool that has a reasonable
correspondence to the U.S. population and is more diverse than traditional samples of college students
(Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015). Moreover, recent research shows that experimental effects
across twelve studies generalized from the original sample to MTurk samples (Coppock 2018). Thus,
despite this study’s use of a convenience sample, the expectation should be that similar effects would be
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uncovered when moving to a more representative sample.
Experimental Design
This section introduces the study’s experimental design and procedure. First, all respondents answered
a host of pre-test questions, including basic demographic information as well as a number of political
variables, ranging from trust in government to attitudes about climate change. It is worth noting that
there was a split-split sample manipulation such that half the respondents answered questions about
‘StealthDemocracy’ (seemore information about thismeasure in the section on the correlates of support)
in the pre-test and half the respondents answered those questions in the post-test.1 Then, respondents
were randomly assigned to read a short vignette about global private environmental governance. Finally,
after exposure to the treatment, respondents answered a post-treatment question battery before being
provided with debriefing screen and information about compensation.
The experimental component of the study seeks to reduce the problem of measuring non-attitudes
by providing participants with varying amounts of information about the ISO and the FSC. The design
thus leverages random assignment to assume that any differences in outcomes following exposure to the
treatment can be attributed to the differences induced by the manipulation. The idea, then, is to isolate
factors that correspond to the theoretical predictions outlined above.
For this purpose, the experiment consisted of four conditions, crafted by the researcher to isolate
pieces of information that were theorized to affect dynamics of support. First, participants in the No
Information control condition did not receive any information about the ISO 14001 environmental
management standards or theFSC.These respondentswere simply told that theywould answerquestions
about global governance. This condition, then, enables the establishment of a neutral baseline to examine
respondents’ reactions in the absence of any information. It thus mirrors the situation most commonly
encountered in survey research.
1This manipulation was implemented to test for the possibility that asking questions about expert or business
involvement might affect respondents’ attitudes toward the ISO and FSC. However, the manipulation did not produce
significant differences in response patterns for the Stealth Democracy items. That said, (1) the results can be replicated when
the sample is restricted to only those respondents who answered those questions in the pre-test, (2) including a control
variable for this design feature does not substantively change the results, and (3) there is no significant interaction between
this manipulation and the substantive conditions
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Second, participants assigned to the Basic condition read a brief text introducing two organizations
involved in global non-governmental environmental standard-setting:
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards
in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards
Organization’s (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for
companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems.
Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to
provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization
produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Themainpurpose of this conditionwas to provide participantswith a simple introduction to the ISO
and the FSC. While these bodies are undoubtedly much more complex than presented, the intention of
the phrasing was to highlight the non-governmental nature of the bodies as well as a sense of the scope of
their functions.
The authority transfer hypothesis predicts that citizens hold and utilize sincere preferences favoring
domestic governments over unelected organizations such as the ISO and the FSC. Thus, the key question
is whether mere awareness of the organizations’ non-governmental, stakeholder-driven decision-making
would be of consequence for public opinion. Thus, the Governance condition augments the basic
condition by providing additional detail about the nature of these bodies. Specifically, it adds the
following text operationalizing central aspects of the authority transfer hypothesis:
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who
develop and monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are
largely made without formal government participation or interference.
This additional text reiterates that the ISO and the FSC are private bodies with decision-making
structures that involve stakeholders such as industry groups and NGOs as opposed to decisions being
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made by national governments. Of course, this is a very stylized and incomplete view of their
decision-making structures, but it highlights a key dimension that, according to the authority transfer
hypothesis, should depress popular support.
By contrast, the competing hypothesis states that information about governance arrangements, by
itself, will not powerfully affect public support. Rather, elite affective cues about the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of these bodieswill have amuchmore powerful effect. In this vein, thePoliticized Governance
condition augments the text by introducing a possible critique of private governance:
Some national politicians and activist groups have raised concerns about these
organizations, suggesting that these private bodies are developing rules and regulations
through non-governmental channels, thus raising serious questions about their democratic
legitimacy.
This finalmanipulationwas intended to add an element akin to apoliticization cue, therebyproviding
participants with the heuristic that there are concerns about a democratic or legitimacy deficit. While the
claim is not particularly substantive in nature, it establishes a connection between private rule making
and potentially lacking legitimacy.
The aim of the experiment, then, is to ascertain whether exposure to any of these frames alters
support for organizations that the public knows little about but which exert significant economic and
political authority. Thus, while the information provided to respondents is invariably incomplete and
stylized, the distinctions between the conditions are grounded in theoretical predictions. To reiterate,
examining differences between the Basic condition and the Governance condition operationalizes
Hypothesis 1, whereas the differences between the Basic condition and the Politicized Governance
condition operationalizes Hypothesis 2.2 It is worth noting here that the No Information condition is
not used to assess the core hypotheses but rather it provides leverage on the non-attitudes question by
enabling a comparison with respondents in the Basic information.
2While I argue that this is the core comparison for the second hypothesis, I also compare theGovernance condition to the
Politicized Governance condition for additional leverage on the question of just how powerful the elite frame is compared to
information about governance arrangements.
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Measures
The key dependent variables capturing attitudes toward global private environmental governance were
measured with three questions. For the first variable, Favorability, respondents were asked: “How
strongly do you favor or oppose global non-governmental bodies setting environmental standards?”
Response options ranged from “strongly oppose” to “strongly favor” on a 5-point scale with a neutral
midpoint. The second outcome, Legitimacy, was based on responses to the question “How legitimate
do you think global non-governmental environmental standard-setting bodies are?”, again measured on
a 5-point scale with response options ranging from “very illegitimate” to “very legitimate”. The variable
Democracy, aimed at capturing perceptions of the democratic nature of such bodies, was measured
by asking respondents “How democratic do you think global non-governmental environmental
standard-setting bodies are?” Again, responses were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from “very
undemocratic” to “very democratic”. It is worth noting here that there was no “don’t know” option
for any of these questions.
These three variables are conceptualized as tapping into thebroader concept of public support toward
bodies such as the ISOor the FSC. Factor analysis revealed that the three variables load onto one common
factor and combining them into a single, additive measure, the Favorability Index, produced a reliable
scale (Cronbach’s α = .80). While I suggest that this index provides a more general measure of support
toward the private governance, I also present results for the individual items that make up the index and
discuss heterogeneity in these results (all variables are recoded 0-1).
Results
Given the lack of prior research on the organizations studied here, before examining the experimental
results, there are a couple of pertinent descriptive questions that merit discussion: does the public
support bodies such as the ISO or the FSC setting environmental standards? Does it perceive them
to be legitimate and democratic? The overarching takeaway is that public opinion appears to be quite
positive. I first concentrate only on those respondents in the No Information condition. Here, 52%
of respondents in this study have either a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of global
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non-governmental bodies setting environmental standards, compared to only 11% who have a negative
opinion. Similarly, 63% of respondents perceive the organizations as legitimate, while only 15% find
them illegitimate. The corresponding democratic assessments are somewhat less positive with only 40%
of respondents indicating they find the bodies either very or somewhat democratic compared to 25%
who find them undemocratic. It is important to note that MTurk samples are more liberal, younger,
and more politically engaged than the general population and thus these point estimates should not be
interpreted as population estimates. I discuss this limitation in the concluding section. Another visible
pattern, displayed in Table 3.1 is a general decline in respondents opting for the neutral category when
being provided with any type of information, compared to the condition that provided no information.
This provides initial evidence that even basic information about global private environmental regulators
can help form initial opinions (but note that the differences in two of the three variables using the full
scale are not significant — see Figure 3.1 below).
Table 3.1: ‘Opinionation’ by Condition
No Information Basic Condition
Tot. Negative Neutral Tot. Positive Tot. Negative Neutral Tot. Positive
Favor Bodies 11 37 52 12 28 61
Bodies Legitimate 15 22 63 12 17 72
Bodies Democratic 25 35 40 17 30 54
Cell entries are the percentage of respondents falling into the combined categories
Next, I turn to the experimental results. I first examine experimental effects vis-à-vis the Basic
condition by regressing the dependent variables on an indicator for the experimental conditions where
the excluded category is the Basic condition. These results are presented in Figure 3.1 (The figure is based
on results presented inTable 3.3 in theAppendix). In theAppendix, I also include Figure 3.4 showing the
means of these variables by experimental condition, which provides additional context about the overall
positive nature of attitudes, mirroring the descriptive discussion above.
The hypothesis drawn from the authority transfer literature suggests that respondents in the
Governance condition would be less supportive than respondents in theBasic condition. This conjecture
captured the argument that individuals would reject global private governance simply as a result of
learning about the governance structure (i.e. private bodies through stakeholder input making decisions
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Figure 3.1: Experimental Results (Study 1)
No Information
Governance
Politicized Governance
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
Favor Bodies Index
Favor Bodies
Bodies Legitimate
Bodies Democratic
Note: OLS regression coefficients; Baseline category: Basic Condition; Underlying Models can be found
in Table 3.3 in the Appendix
as opposed to governments). If thiswere indeed the case onewould expect to see a negative and significant
coefficient for the Governance condition. However, this conjecture is not supported by the data as the
difference between the Governance condition and the Basic condition is not statistically significant for
any of the four dependent variables. Thus, individuals do not appear to reject bodies such as the ISO or
the FSC simply on the grounds that they are non-governmental and market-driven.
The second hypothesis stated that cues about a democratic deficit would lead to lower levels of
support. Here, I first compare the Politicized Governance condition to the Basic condition. For each
of the Index, Favorability, and Democracy variables there is a clear statistically significant decline in
positivity when comparing the Politicized Governance condition to the Basic condition (all at p<0.05).
The only exception is the Legitimacy dependent variable. While I argue that the central comparison
here is between the Basic condition and the Politicized Governance condition, it is also instructive to
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examine the difference between the Governance condition and the Politicized Governance condition to
see whether these are actually significantly different from one another. The results, which are presented
in Table 3.4 in the Appendix, show that the same basic pattern also holds when comparing the Politicized
Governance condition to the Governance condition (Index andDemocracy at p<0.01 and Favorability at
p<0.05). Once again, however, the differences in Legitimacy do not reach traditional levels of statistical
significance (p=.08).
Lastly, there was no explicit expectation about the difference between the Basic condition and the
No Information condition. That said, however, the results are nonetheless of some interest. While the
means in theBasic condition are higher across all four variables, only the difference in terms of democratic
evaluation reaches statistical significance (p<0.05). This result can be interpreted in at least twoways. On
the one hand, it suggests that peoples’ conceptions of the bodies in question are generally quite positive
and thus they align very closely in the conditionwhere people base their evaluationonno information and
the condition where people receive basic information. On the other hand, this could also be construed as
evidence that people do not have fully formed opinions and that the information provided in the basic
condition does not really augment understanding. I return to this question in the Discussion section.
study 2
The results from the first study provide initial evidence that information about organizations’ governance
structures does not diminish public support. Rather, elite rhetoric claiming that these organizations are
illegitimate depresses support. While these results are informative, the first study has some limitations
that I seek to address in a second study. First and foremost, it is unclear whether the findings from the first
study are generalizable beyond theMTurk sample, which is a convenience sample that skewsmore liberal
than the general population. Thus, as this paper is concerned with measuring public opinion toward
these types of organizations, it is vital to be able to discuss the substantive level of approval these bodies
enjoy based on amore representative sample. Second, there is a need to unpack whether it matters which
domestic elites are politicizing private governance organizations. In addition, the second study seeks to
heighten internal validity by reducing imbalances in vignette length and more precisely operationalizing
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the core elements of the authority transfer hypothesis in the vignettes.
Sample
For the second study3 I contracted with Survey Sampling International (SSI) for a sample of US adults
balanced by age, sex, ethnicity, and census region. The survey was fielded in February-March 2018 and
yielded a sample of 1,012 respondents. The resulting sample was 51% female and 73%White. The median
age was 42 years and 64% of respondents reported having at least some college education. Including
leaners with partisans, the partisan make-up of the sample was 45%Democrat, 39%Republican, and 16%
Independent. While this is typically less liberal than anMTurk sample, it is nonetheless not representative
of the country at large, as respondents may be more highly educated and more politically engaged.
Furthermore, partisans in this sample may not be representative of partisans in the general population
since theymaybemore sophisticated and attentive than average. I further discuss these sample limitations
and the implications for the results in the conclusion.
Experimental Design & Measures
The basic experimental set-up mirrors that of the first study. TheNo Information and Basic conditions
are largely equivalent to the ones used in the first study (The full texts of the conditions can be found in
the Appendix).4 TheGovernance condition was modified to more precisely operationalize core tenets of
the authority transfer hypothesis by highlighting that “standards are largely negotiated and implemented
without formal participation or ratification by national governments.” Here, the vignette thus more
explicitly emphasizes loss of governmental authority in the domains of negotiation, ratification and
implementation.
The most significant departure from the first study concerns the inclusion of a broader variety of
conditions containing elite rhetoric providing affective cues about the organizations. Specifically, instead
of the generic Politicization condition, here I operationalize this concept with three different conditions
whereby the politicization cue is attributed to either journalists (PoliticizedMedia condition), Democrat
3This study was pre-registered on aspredicted.com: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d6jk76
4The Basic condition was edited slightly for length.
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politicians (Politicized Democrats condition), or Republican politicians (Politicized Republicans
condition). Compared to the first study, the length of these conditions was significantly reduced (by
more than half) and the cue explicitly stated that the cue-giver “condemn[ed] the organizations as
undemocratic and illegitimate.” These politicization conditions enable testing of bothwhether anymain
effects differ depending on who is seeking to de-legitimate private governance organizations and whether
reactions can be characterized as responsive to messages from any domestic elite or whether respondents
are simply reacting in ways consistent with work on partisan identities and motivated reasoning.
The dependent variables are the same as in the first study. Once again, these variables load on a single
factor and combining theFavorability,Legitimacy, andDemocracyquestions into an additive Index yields
a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .78). For analyses in which results are broken down by partisanship,
leaners are included with partisans.
Results
First, in terms of descriptive results regarding the nature of support toward private organizations
developing environmental standards, the results in this more representative sample largely confirm
those of the MTurk sample. Restricting the sample to those in the No Information condition, we
see that opinion is generally favorable with 45% of respondents having a very favorable or somewhat
favorable opinion compared to 16% of respondents who hold an unfavorable view. Figure 3.2 displays
the coefficients on the indicators for the experimental conditions compared to the Basic condition. An
initial take-away is that favorability increases when respondents are provided with some information
about the organizations, suggesting that people are generally positively predisposed toward such forms
of non-governmental private governance.
Recall thatH1 suggested that support in theGovernance condition would be lower than in the Basic
condition. Replicating the results from the first study, I findno support for this conjecture. Across all four
dependent variables, I find no evidence that providing respondents with information suggesting a lack
of governmental control over negotiation, ratification, and implementation of environmental standards
depresses support.
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Figure 3.2: Experimental Results (Study 2)
No Information
Governance
Politicized Media
Politicized Democrats
Politicized Republicans
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05
Favor Bodies Index
Favor Bodies
Bodies Legitimate
Bodies Democratic
Note: OLS regression coefficients; Baseline category: Basic Condition; Underlying Models can be found
in Table 3.5 in the Appendix
By contrast, Figure 3.2 does provide support forH2 and the conjecture that elite cues affect support
for global private environmental governance. Specifically, respondents in the Politicized Media and
Politicized Democrats conditions reported significantly lower favorability than respondents in the Basic
condition. Interestingly, contrary to expectations, this result was not replicated for respondents in the
Politicized Republicans condition. I discuss potential reasons for this finding below. Moreover, the
Politicized Media and Politicized Democrats conditions also differ significantly from the Governance
condition for two and three of the dependent variables, respectively (see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.6 in the
Appendix).
Although my main conjecture was that the three politicization conditions should yield significant
negative main effects,5 I also suggested that there may be heterogeneity in the effects by respondents’
5It is worth noting that when the three politicization conditions are pooled I also observe significant differences between
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partisanship.6 Therefore, in Figure 3.3 I estimate the effects of the experimental treatments forDemocrats
and Republicans.
Figure 3.3: Experimental Results by Partisanship (Study 2)
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the effects uncovered above look very similar to the effects for Democrats.
The figure shows that Democrat respondents exhibit decreased levels of support in both the Politicized
Media and the Politicized Democrats conditions compared to the Basic condition. There is no effect
of the Politicized Republicans condition for these respondents, suggesting that while partisans respond
most strongly to partisan cues, there is no evidence of a backlash effect such that support increases in
response to a de-legitimating cue from the out-party. Turning next to Republican respondents, first
it is noteworthy that providing Basic information actually increases support when compared to the
No Information condition in which respondents are simply told that they will be answering questions
about global governance. None of the other conditions affects support among Republican respondents
and there is no evidence of any partisan dynamic in response to the politicization conditions. Indeed,
Republicans are responding in a similar fashion to Democrats but the inflated standard errors prevent
detection of significant effects. One reason for this may be the fact that the domain of regulation is the
environment, which is a more liberal issue, thereby making a Republican cue less credible. Or it may
be that the information conveyed by the affective cue is already ‘priced-in’ by Republican respondents
this pooled condition and theBasic condition (with the exception of theLegitimacy dependent variable which yields a p-value
of 0.092).
6It is worth noting that there also are no significant differences between theBasic condition and thePoliticized conditions
among Independents, but I caution against interpreting this result given the small sample size (n=161).
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given their more negative baseline attitudes toward environmental regulation writ large. That said, it
is important to note that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for Democrats are
statistically distinguishable from the coefficients for Republicans.
In sum, the results of the second study complement those of the first. Across two samples and
different operationalizations of both authority transfer and elite rhetoric, no evidence was uncovered
to support the hypothesis that information about private environmental governance organizations’
authority is sufficient to decrease public support. By contrast, the results highlight the power that
domestic elite rhetoric plays in de-legitimating private governance.
correlates of support for private environmental governance
The preceding analyses provide unique experimental evidence into the dynamics that affect support for
global regulatory governance in the environmental domain. Thus far the results have indicated that
survey respondents in the U.S., across two samples, are generally favorably predisposed toward global
private environmental bodies and that affective cues about a democratic deficit as opposed to simple
information about governance arrangements reduces support. This section aims to provide additional
context to the core experimental results by more broadly examining the correlates of support for this
emerging form of governance.
Given the lack of prior empirical work on support for bodies such as the ISO or the FSC, my core
objective is to examine a relatively parsimonious model predicting favorability (measured here using the
additiveFavor Bodies Index) to provide a better understanding of the correlates of attitudes toward global
private environmental governance. With this aim in mind, first, the models include basic demographic
variables such as age (in years), dummyvariables denoting non-White respondents and sex, and education
level. Second, the models include political characteristics that should arguably affect support for private
environmental regulatory bodies based on existing work on determinants of domestic institutional trust
and global governance more broadly. These variables include party identification on a 7-point scale
ranging from “Strong Republican” to “Strong Democrat”, support for limited government, and trust
in government, as well as a variable measuring how concerned respondents are about climate change.
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To ease interpretation in the regression models, all continuous variables (with the exception of age) are
rescaled to run from zero to one.
Lastly, my theoretical account for why respondents might not inherently reject this form of
governance was informed by the work on Stealth Democracy in the domestic U.S. context. Therefore,
I include a variable tapping into this concept to test whether respondents with this set of attitudes are
indeed more favorably predisposed toward bodies such as the ISO and the FSC. The variable, Stealth
Democracy, is operationalized using the four-item agree-disagree battery originally developed byHibbing
and Theiss-Morse (2002). The four items tap into a set of beliefs associated with the desire for efficient,
non-involved government. The items are (1) “ElectedOfficials would help the countrymore if theywould
stop talking and just take action on important problems”, (2) “What people call ‘compromise’ in politics
is really just selling out on one’s principles”, (3) “Our government would run better if decisions were
left up to successful business people”, and (4) “Our government would run better if decisions were left
up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people”. Unfortunately, although
these items are generally positively correlated, the scale reliability coefficients for this index were quite
low (Cronbach’s α = .42 in study 1 and α = .56 in study 2).7 This low reliability is consistent with
work showing that people can selectively embrace Stealth Democracy traits and that support for the
expert andbusiness components of the scale donotnecessarily gohand-in-hand (Fernández-Martínez and
Fábregas 2018), which is why some work has sought to examine support for expert decision-making and
business involvement independently (see e.g., Gangl 2007; Rapaeli 2016; Bertsou and Pastorella 2017).
Therefore, any results stemming from the indices are also discussed in disaggregated form to facilitate
clearer interpretation.
The results of two OLS regression models are presented in Table 3.2, with MTurk (Study 1) results
presented in the first column and SSI (Study 2) results in the second column. The first set of coefficients
simply reproduce the effects of the experimental conditions on the Favor Bodies Index, showing again
that information operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis does not reduce supportwhereas elite
rhetoric providing affective cues does.
7It is worth noting that responses to these questionsweremeasured on 4-point scales in Study 1 and 5-point scales in Study
2.
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Table 3.2: Correlates of Favorability toward Global Private Environmental Governance
MTurk Sample SSI Sample
Experimental Conditions
No information -0.056* -0.048*
(0.0260) (0.0204)
Governance -0.039 -0.020
(0.0262) (0.0204)
Politicized Governance -0.081**
(0.0260)
PoliticizedMedia -0.060**
(0.0204)
Politicized Democrats -0.056**
(0.0204)
Politicized Republicans -0.010
(0.0204)
Age 0.000 -0.001***
(0.0009) (0.0004)
Female 0.017 -0.013
(0.0192) (0.0122)
Non-White -0.034 -0.012
(0.0249) (0.0141)
Education -0.002 0.043*
(0.0330) (0.0189)
Party Identification 0.116** 0.066***
(0.0361) (0.0182)
Limited Government -0.001 -0.005
(0.0412) (0.0172)
Trust in Government 0.132** 0.149***
(0.0428) (0.0225)
Stealth Democracy 0.183** 0.122***
(0.0599) (0.0326)
Concern about Climate Change 0.155*** 0.196***
(0.0358) (0.0207)
Constant 0.339*** 0.445***
(0.0664) (0.0362)
N 494 1003
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Turning first to the demographic factors, we see slight differences between the twomodels whichmay
be attributable to havingmore leverage on these questions in the SSI study given its more diverse sample.
While age, education, race, and sex do not appear to be correlated in the MTurk study, we do see that
younger and more highly educated respondents have more favorable attitudes toward bodies such as the
ISO and the FSC.
Partisanship, measured such that identifying as a “Strong Democrat” is coded at the top of the scale,
is strongly positively associated with favorability, implying that Democrats, as opposed to Republicans,
are more supportive of such bodies, ceteris paribus. Somewhat surprisingly, the Limited Government
variable, which captures agreement with the belief that the government is taking on responsibilities that
should be the purview of individuals and businesses, is not significantly correlated with the dependent
variable. Moreover, Trust in Government is positively associated with support. This latter finding is
of interest as it indicates that, contrary to some suggestions, there may not necessarily be a tension
between accepting global non-governmental regulation and support for national governmental political
institutions. This finding mirrors some work on support for the EU that shows that trust in domestic
institutions is associated with support for supranational organizations (Rohrschneider 2002; Hobolt
2012). Unsurprisingly, concern about climate change is positively correlated with support for global
private climate governance.
Notably, as conjectured in Hypothesis 3, there is a strong and statistically significant positive
relationship between holding views that are indicative of stealth democracy and favorability toward
bodies such as the ISO and the FSC setting environmental standards. Due to the low scale reliability
statistic for the Stealth Democracy Index, this model was also run with the four distinct variables that
make up the index. These disaggregated results reveal an interesting pattern: in both studies the results
of the index are driven by the “take action” question and the “experts” question. Specifically, believing
that elected officials “should stop talking and just take action on important issues” is associated with
greater favorability, as is the desire to leave decisions up to independent experts. Conversely, there is
no relationship between holding the belief that business people should be entrusted with decisions and
favorability. I also tested the conjecture that the StealthDemocracy attitudes or their components interact
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with the conditions, in particular when comparing theNo Information condition to theBasic condition.
However, contrary to these expectation, StealthDemocracy attitudes do not appear to bemoderating the
effect of the conditions.
discussion
What do these results imply? Primarily, the results seem to contradict the view that people will reject
global bodies simply after learning about the non-governmental nature of their authority. Rather, it
seems that attitudes turn more negative when people are exposed to frames providing affective cues
suggesting that the bodies are not democratic or legitimate. More broadly, these findings suggest that
awareness of organizations’ increased authority is not a sufficient condition for declining public support.
Indeed,while the transfer of authoritymaybe an issue that canbemade salient and consequential through
elite frames, the results here suggest that declining support is not an automatic process that is purely
driven by sincere preferences about what constitutes legitimate governance in the eyes of the public. This
complicates the original authority transfer hypothesis by highlighting the role that political entrepreneurs
can play in driving opinion dynamics about global governance organizations via quite simple affective
framing (cf. Zürn 2018).
The experimental and observational results also provide some preliminary insight into the question
of non-attitudes. In general, support for organizations was higher when respondents were provided
with some basic information compared to when they were simply asked to render an opinion about the
ISO and the FSC. This suggests that it is important to ensure that respondents have at least minimal
information upon which to base their opinion and, in this case, illustrates that this kind of information
is useful for respondents. Moreover, the observational results show that attitudes toward global private
environmental organizations are related to other attitude constructs in meaningful ways, positing that
attitudes toward these bodies are not simply random noise. In particular, the research suggests that
there is value in applying the concept of stealth democracy to attitudes about global governance. Experts
and businesses are integral parts of polycentric climate governance, and global private governance more
generally, and thus attitudes toward these will help explain citizens’ perceptions.
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The partisan dynamics uncovered in this study raise some interesting questions for future research
about the power of elite frames conditional on underlying partisan attitudes. Republicans have lower
levels of support for global private governance than Democrats and we do not see any significant
experimental results for this subset of respondents. One reason for thismay be that forRepublicans, who
are alreadynegatively predisposed toward these bodies, this negative information is already ‘priced-in’ and
thus the frames providing affective cues are less likely to change their opinion (for a similar dynamic see
e.g., Goodwin et al. 2018).
conclusion
Asprivate actors have become central players in global environmental governance, questions of legitimacy
have been front and center in the debate. This paper suggested that both the normative and the empirical
literatures on the legitimacy of global governance need to paymore attention to citizens’ attitudes toward
a broader set of organizations. The trajectory of public contestation of the EU highlights that metrics
of legitimation can easily change when bodies become politicized. More specifically, assessments of
legitimacy that rely on an audience legitimation component have to take into account the fact that
organizations’ audiences are not set in stone and can easily expand to include the general public.
Descriptively, results from two surveys suggested that the public is generally supportive of bodies
such as the ISO and the FSC being involved in setting environmental standards. These findings are
noteworthy because they provide initial evidence that, in the absence of politicization, there is no inherent
opposition toward this form of governance. Moreover, results from two experiments suggest that,
contrary to the expectations of the authority transfer hypothesis, providing people with information
about organizations’ non-governmental, industry-involved decision-making structures does not reduce
support. By contrast, the evidence presented here highlights the role that elites can play in de-legitimating
bodies such as the ISO and the FSC through narratives emphasizing that governance arrangements are
undemocratic and illegitimate.
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the studies used in this chapter. The
samples used are not representative samples and while the SSI sample is a better match to the U.S.
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population in terms of partisanship than the MTurk sample, both samples are likely to include people
who are more politically engaged and aware than the general population. Moreover, it is possible that
the partisan subgroups are not representative of those subgroups in the population. These limitations
affect the generalizability of the findings beyond the current samples in two ways. First, the correlational
analyses showed that partisanship and other socio-demographic are associated with support for global
private governance and thus levels of supportmay differ in amore representative sample. Given that these
samples arguably skew liberal and more educated the current point estimates may overstate support and
potentially provide an upper bound for the level of support. Second, it is also important to acknowledge
that the effect sizes may be smaller in more representative samples that include less engaged respondents.
Futureworkwithmore representative samples is thus needed tomakemore precise and reliable inferences
about the exact levels of support toward global private governance as well as corroborating that the
experimental effects replicate in those samples.
What are the implications of these findings for the broader debate surrounding the legitimacy of
global private environmental regulation? On the one hand, the results suggest that, at present, public
opinionmayprovide a ‘permissive consensus’ to the actors involved in private environmental governance.
Moreover, this support may not necessarily decline when people learn more about the organizations’
decision-making structures and authority. On the other hand, support could decline if national elites start
to become involved and seek to increase contestation. Eitherway, empirical accounts of legitimacy should
be cognizant of the role that the public could yet come to play in legitimating global private governance.
This paper set out to address the explicitly identified need for both more public opinion and
interdisciplinary research on environmental governance (von Staden 2012; Cao et al. 2014; Vogel 2008),
as well as more investigation of politicization of global governance organizations beyond the case of the
EU (Zürn 2016). Furthermore, the paper contributes to an emerging literature seeking to understand
public support for non-majoritarian and technocratic governance structuresmore generally (e.g., Bertsou
and Pastorella 2017) and extends the applicability of the Stealth Democracy framework to governance
arrangements beyond the nation-state.
In conclusion, an increasingly interconnected world and global challenges require coordination
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beyond nation-states, and the rise of private governance — whether in the environmental domain or
more generally — is merely one facet of contemporary global governance. The myriad organizations
involved in global governance, from the bodies discussed in this paper to more established international
actors such as the EU, increasingly need to be viewed as legitimate by the public to remain effective in
addressing complex global challenges (Buchanan andKeohane 2006; Tallberg andZürn 2017). Advancing
our understanding of when a host of different types of institutional arrangements will be supported and
perceived as legitimate by the public as well as whether de-legitimating elite rhetoric can be counteracted
presents an important avenue for future research.
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appendix
Stimulus Materials for Study 1
No Information Condition
Next we will ask you a couple of questions about global governance.
Basic Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Governance Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who develop and
monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are largely made without formal
government participation or interference.
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Politicized Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who develop and
monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are largely made without
formal government participation or interference. Some national politicians and activist groups have
raised concerns about these organizations, suggesting that these private bodies are developing rules and
regulations through non-governmental channels, thus raising serious questions about their democratic
legitimacy.
Stimulus Materials for Study 2
No Information Condition
Next we will ask you a couple of questions about global governance.
Basic Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
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In sum, both the ISO and the FSC are bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards.
Governance Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and
monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely
negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments.
Politicized Republicans Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and
monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely
negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This
has led Republican politicians to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.
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Politicized Democrats Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and
monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely
negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This
has led Democratic politicians to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.
PoliticizedMedia Condition
The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting
There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area
of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) 14001
environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement
effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental
organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.
Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and
monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely
negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This
has led journalists to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.
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Additional Figures & Tables
Figure 3.4: The Effect of Information on Support and Perceptions of Legitimacy and Democracy of
Global Private Environmental Government Institutions (Study 1)
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Figure 3.5: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 2)
No Information
Basic
Politicized Media
Politicized Democrats
Politicized Republicans
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1
Favor Bodies Index
Favor Bodies
Bodies Legitimate
Bodies Democratic
Table 3.3: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Basic Condition) (Study 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Favor Bodies Index Favor Bodies Bodies Legitimate Bodies Democratic
No Information -0.051 -0.037 -0.039 -0.075*
(0.0273) (0.0317) (0.0336) (0.0321)
Governance -0.022 0.000 -0.036 -0.029
(0.0275) (0.0319) (0.0338) (0.0323)
Politicized -0.078** -0.067* -0.061 -0.106**
(0.0274) (0.0318) (0.0337) (0.0323)
Constant 0.659*** 0.667*** 0.691*** 0.618***
(0.0193) (0.0224) (0.0237) (0.0227)
N 503 503 503 503
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 3.4: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Favor Bodies Index Favor Bodies Bodies Legitimate Bodies Democratic
No Information -0.029 -0.037 -0.004 -0.045
(0.0275) (0.0319) (0.0338) (0.0323)
Basic 0.022 -0.000 0.036 0.029
(0.0275) (0.0319) (0.0338) (0.0323)
Politicized -0.056* -0.067* -0.025 -0.077*
(0.0276) (0.0320) (0.0339) (0.0325)
Constant 0.637*** 0.667*** 0.655*** 0.589***
(0.0195) (0.0227) (0.0240) (0.0230)
N 503 503 503 503
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table 3.5: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Basic Condition) (Study 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Favor Bodies Index Favor Bodies Bodies Legitimate Bodies Democratic
No Information -0.056* -0.085** -0.051 -0.031
(0.0223) (0.0277) (0.0263) (0.0263)
Governance -0.019 -0.013 -0.004 -0.038
(0.0224) (0.0277) (0.0264) (0.0264)
PoliticizedMedia -0.063** -0.059* -0.062* -0.068*
(0.0224) (0.0278) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Politicized Dems -0.070** -0.088** -0.066* -0.058*
(0.0223) (0.0277) (0.0263) (0.0263)
Politicized Reps -0.014 -0.027 0.018 -0.032
(0.0224) (0.0277) (0.0264) (0.0264)
Constant 0.661*** 0.673*** 0.663*** 0.648***
(0.0159) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0187)
N 1011 1011 1011 1011
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Favor Bodies Index Favor Bodies Bodies Legitimate Bodies Democratic
No Information -0.037 -0.072** -0.047 0.007
(0.0222) (0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0262)
Basic 0.019 0.013 0.004 0.038
(0.0224) (0.0277) (0.0264) (0.0264)
PoliticizedMedia -0.045* -0.046 -0.058* -0.030
(0.0223) (0.0277) (0.0263) (0.0263)
Politicized Dems -0.052* -0.074** -0.061* -0.020
(0.0222) (0.0276) (0.0262) (0.0262)
Politicized Reps 0.005 -0.013 0.022 0.006
(0.0223) (0.0276) (0.0263) (0.0263)
Constant 0.643*** 0.660*** 0.658*** 0.609***
(0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0186)
N 1011 1011 1011 1011
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Chapter 4
Do Elite Frames Trump Institutional Design? Unpacking the Dynamics of Support
for Global Governance
introduction
As the organizations involved in global governance have acquired more authority over time (see e.g.,
Hooghe and Marks 2015), some have increasingly come under political attack. From the Brexit vote in
the United Kingdom to President Donald Trump’s attacks on international institutions like the United
Nations (UN), both political elites and the public seem increasingly hostile toward governance efforts
beyond the nation-state. And while public opposition toward bodies such as the European Union (EU)
or the World Trade Organization (WTO) is by no means a new phenomenon, it appears as though
opposition is no longer confined to specific organizations, but rather extends to the system of global
governance writ large. This has led some observers to frame this development as the ‘populist backlash’
against liberal internationalism and the global legal order (e.g., Posner 2017; Rodrik 2017).
Such backlash has consequences. Buchanan and Keohane’s (2006: 407) seminal work on the
legitimacy of global governance institutions proffers that “[d]etermining whether global governance
institutions are legitimate — and whether they are widely perceived to be so — is an urgent matter”
and that such “institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics.”
Expanding on this point, Tallberg and Zürn (2017) argue that, inter alia, organizations require legitimacy
to remain focal institutions for global cooperation, to be able to propagate rules and regulations,
and to ensure compliance with said rules and regulations. Thus, political backlash, politicization
and the de-legitimization of global governance can undermine global governance efforts and impede
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cross-national and supranational collaboration aimed at addressing some of the world’s foremost
coordination challenges (e.g., environmental or financial regulation).
But how and why does the public come to oppose the organizations involved in global governance
in the first place? The majority of the evidence on this question comes from the literature on support
for the EU, and while it was initially concerned with only that organization, more recent work has
sought to derive generalizable hypotheses that can be applied to any organization involved in global
governance. Research emanating from the study of the EU’s politicization has proposed a central
hypothesis suggesting that citizens have sincere preferences against delegating authority to supranational
organizations. This work, coupled with normative studies of institutional legitimacy, has pointed to
features and procedures that should enhance the legitimacy of global governance organizations, chiefly
institutional rules that constrain these bodies and vest powers in democratic nation-states (in addition
to more general ideals such as participation of civil society organizations and transparency). Recently,
scholars of the EUhave also started looking at the role that national elites (especially populist and far-right
political entrepreneurs) play in driving opposition to global governance. That said, this approach suggests
that elites are merely mobilizing attitudes that naturally develop as a response to authority being ceded
from national governments.
This chapter sets out to test the key claims of the authority transfer literature. More importantly,
however, I argue that theprimacyof institutional factors as underpinning support for global governance is
overstated. By contrast, I contend that elite rhetoric providing affective cues suggesting the organizations
are illegitimate are key drivers of attitudes toward global governance. Importantly, I suggest that these
cueswill notmerely resonatewith co-partisans, but rather that these cueswill affect opinionmorebroadly.
While, I afford that these cues may be moderated by partisanship such that the effects are larger for cues
fromco-partisans, I also contend that out-party cues should also depress support. This expectation stands
in contrast to work on partisan resistance or partisan motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013; Zaller
1992) and is rooted in the belief that the dimension of conflict here is between existing domestic governing
institutions and new institutions that may threaten national sovereignty. Thus, I argue, attitudes toward
the myriad organizations involved in global governance are not driven by sincere preferences over their
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institutional designs, but instead by domestic cues claiming that these institutions are legitimate or not.
Hence, extending the work in the third chapter, I proffer and test the hypothesis that elite rhetoric
providing affective cues can depress support, irrespective of the known facts about the organizations.
In addition, I investigate whether attitudes toward these organizations are truly a function of their
global or international nature, or whether non-governmental domestic rule-making bodies would receive
the same reactions. While implied in much of the existing literature, the impact of the international
character of these organizations has not been tested empirically. Therefore, I test whether support for
non-governmental regulatory bodies follows a similar trajectory when the organizations are described as
operating at the domestic level.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I define the class of organizations that I seek to generalize to
in this chapter. Second, I provide an overview of the literature on public support for global governance
organizations. Third, I outlinemy theoretical approach and hypotheses. Fourth, I introduce the conjoint
experimental design that I use to test my hypotheses and discuss results from a pre-test validating key
conjoint attributes. Fifth, I discuss results from a conjoint experiment that was fielded on two samples.
Finally, I conclude by drawing attention to the implications of the study for work on global governance
and its politicization more broadly.
scoping global governance
Global governance encompassesmyriad organizations fromwell-known regional integration bodies (e.g.,
the EU) to international organizations (e.g., the UN) to private regulatory bodies (e.g., the International
Organization for Standardization [ISO]). It is thus important to set some scope conditions for the
work in this paper. Tallberg and Zürn (2017: 5) discuss global governance as it pertains to international
organizations, by which they mean “formal, multilateral, and bureaucratic arrangements established to
further cooperation among states.” Yet they readily admit that their framework (which is an extension
of the original authority transfer argument) can be extended to any other form of global governance
including private or informal arrangements. Some recent work in this tradition (e.g., Anderson et al.
2017) thus conceptualizes global governance institutions more broadly to encompass bilateral, informal,
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or private arrangements.
I define a global governance organization as any supranational or transnational non-governmental
organization that exercises authority that was either formally or informally ceded from nation-states.
This conceptualization explicitly covers a broad range of institutional configurations including the
examples introduced above (see also Zürn 2018). However, rather than examining support for specific
organizations, I examine support for characteristics that are widespread across a plethora of institutions.
Therefore, this is not a study of the EU or any other specific body, but of the likely opinion dynamics
surrounding a class of non-governmental organizations.
The drawbacks of focusing on generalizations, rather than specific examples such as the EU or the
UN, are twofold. First, the results will not tell us exactly how much people support any organization
in particular. Second, survey participants will be responding to hypothetical institutions with which
they have no familiarity. However, this design choice also has considerable benefits. First, focusing on
specific institutional arrangements rather than named organizations reduces concerns about measuring
non-attitudes. Survey participants are not asked to indicate support for an organization they potentially
know very little about, but rather are asked to respond to more easily relatable features of institutional
design. Second, moving to the hypothetical domain allows for variation in the politicization of
organizations and ensures that this dimension can be manipulated and randomly assigned by the
researcher. This would not be possible if respondents were asked about organizations for which they
have already formed an opinion based on their existing information environment. Third, the global
governance landscape includes a host of organizations and institutional structures and thus focusing on
the constituent parts potentially provides more leverage than focusing on a limited set of organizations
that have received attention in the past but may not be representative of the population of global
governance bodies.1
Moreover, it is worth highlighting that I explicitly examine support for organizations or regulatory
bodies. This stands in contrast tomuch of the nascent literature that is empirically examining support for
international agreements (e.g., Freyburg et al. 2016; Bernauer et al. 2016; Bechtel et al. 2017) as opposed to
1The extant literature has focused on a limited set of organizations (e.g., the UN or the EU) and research has followed
politicization rather than preceded it, thus making it difficult to assess the trajectory that led to declining support.
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the actors involved in global governance per se. I am thus interested in the legitimacy of the organizations
and not the procedures that created the organizations. This is an important distinction because it allows
me to adopt the broader conceptualization of global governance organizations outlined above. I can thus
manipulate features of the organizationswithout reference to international agreements that createdmany
(but not all) types of actors involved in global governance.
It is worth noting here that the decision to also examine howorganizations’ jurisdiction (i.e. domestic
or international) affects support complicates what other types of features can realistically bemanipulated
because any feature must make sense for bodies at both the global and the domestic US level.2 However,
framing the choice tasks around ‘regulatory bodies’ alleviates some of these concerns. Regulation is
central tomost global governance efforts. Indeed, some early defenses of the EUagainst thosewhodecried
the organization’s democratic deficit conceptualized the organization as a ‘regulatory’ actor (Majone
1994).
support for global governance
Scholarly work on the question of public support for global governance can be found in a few political
science literatures. First, there is a relatively small body of literature focusing on individual-level factors
associated with support for global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations (UN). This work largely relies on
large scale cross-national surveys such as the Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, Asia Barometer, theWorld
Values Survey (WVS), or the PEW global attitudes study to examine how individual-level factors ranging
from demographics (Hessami 2011; Edwards 2009), social and political trust, perceived or experienced
corruption (Torgler 2008; Breen and Gillanders 2015), or perceptions of state influence (Johnson 2011)
affect support for these organizations.
The case of the UN provides a useful illustration of some of the trends surrounding support for
global governance organizations. On the onehand,whileworkbyGravelle (2011) shows that global public
2While conjoint experiments technically allow some possible combinations of features to be excluded, I opt for a fully
randomized design with no constraints on the relationships between different features under consideration.
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opinion toward the UN was net positive across 117 countries, it also highlighted that most publics have
limited knowledge about the organization upon which to base opinions. This research points to the
potential malleability of attitudes toward even the most prominent of global governance organizations.
On the other hand, Holyk’s (2010:173-174) overview of Americans’ attitudes toward the UN points
toward a clear decline in support over time.
Somewhat in contrast to this nascent and still sparse literature on public support for a wide range
of organizations involved in global governance, research on support for the EU is quite extensive. Early
work on support for the EU— or more accurately opposition to it as captured through the concept of
Euroscepticism— also focused on individual-level determinants ranging from economic considerations
to national identity and trust in government (e.g., McLaren 2007; Gabel 1998). Two aspects of the EU
literature are worth highlighting here. First, the literature acknowledges the role that elites played in
mobilizing opposition toward the EU and shows that opinion toward the organization is susceptible to
framing effects (e.g., Gabel andScheve 2007;Hooghe andMarks 2005; 2009;DeVries andEdwards 2009).
Second, in search ofmore generalizable explanations, scholars have recently expanded the study of public
opinion dynamics vis-à-vis the EU by invoking the more broadly applicable concept of politicization,
which is centered around examiningwhen organizations become publicly contested. The idea here is that
citizens come to believe that a domain is not zero sum and that it thus requires public deliberation. The
key hypothesis in this line of thinking is that citizens will seek public deliberation over organizations once
they notice that substantial authority has been transferred from the nation-state to global organizations.
Hence, this authority transfer hypothesis entails that the public has sincere preferences over the legitimate
locus of political authority.
The EU, of course, is merely one example of a ‘regional organization.’ Indeed, one central benefit
of the authority transfer hypothesis was its generalizability beyond the EU case and its call to study
regional integration beyond the European case (e.g., Zürn 2014; 2016). That said, to date there is
limited research on public support for regional integration outside of Europe. Some exceptions include
Schlipphak’s (2015) examination ofUNASUR and the AfricanUnion, as well as work onNAFTA (Davis
1998; Wals et al. 2015) and the potential support for regional integration in South-East Asia (Jhee 2009;
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Kwon 2010). These studies examined individual-level characteristics and did not look at elite rhetoric
or variation in institutional design. This is potentially problematic as Duina and Lenz’s (2018) analysis
of regional organizations suggests that the EU boasts comparatively strong performance on a number of
institutional indicators and thus should fare comparatively better in terms of legitimacy perceptions than
other regional organizations.
Some research has sought to unpack the specific institutional features that help bestow public
legitimacy upon organizations involved in global governance. This research encompasses both normative
discussions of legitimating properties and empirical studies examining the relation between institutional
features and support. The normative literature posits that organizations that have transparent avenues
for civil society participation, that require ongoing consent from national governments, and whose
decisions are made through democratic decision-making processes will be deemed more legitimate (see
e.g., Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). While these arguments originated as
normative ideals, some recent research has sought to empirically test these conjectures.
Bernauer and colleagues (2016), perform a series of experiments in the UK and Germany to examine
how features associated with input (or procedure) and output (or performance) legitimacy affect support
for national governments adopting a global environmental governance agreement. The output features
they examine are (1) costs, operationalized as howmuch the agreement would cost an average household
per month; (2) relative benefits, operationalized as whether health benefits in one’s country would be
larger or smaller than in other countries; and (3) problem-solving effectiveness, operationalized as the
extent to which the agreement would reduce air pollution. As expected, the results show that higher
costs decrease support, whereas higher benefits and higher effectiveness increase support.
More importantly for present purposes, they examine how procedural features — namely
transparency, civil society participation, and approval from national legislatures — affect support.
Transparency is operationalized as whether journalists have access to the negotiations or whether
negotiations are confidential such that the public only learns of the results upon conclusion of
the negotiations. Civil society participation is operationalized by what types of non-governmental
organizations are involved in negotiations (e.g., environmental groups, scientists, business groups, or
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none). Lastly, the agreement either needs to be approved by the national government or merely by a
majority of negotiating countries. While there are some differences in the results between the UK and
theGerman experiment, these procedural factors are less consequential for public support. Transparency
and national parliamentary oversight over implementation of the agreement have small positive effects
on support whereas the participation of non-governmental groups makes no real difference.
Similarly, a working paper by Freyburg and colleagues (2016) examines how procedural features affect
support for international agreements on climate change, the refugee crisis, and the financial crisis in
Switzerland, France, Germany and the UK. Specifically, they manipulate who negotiates the agreement
on behalf of domestic countries (government representatives, members of parliament, experts, private
businesses), whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in the negotiations, how
the positions of the negotiating parties are determined (e.g., based on national interest, a search for an
effective solution, etc.), whether the agreement requires consensus from all parties or merely a majority,
and lastly whomonitors the agreement (the national government, international organizations, or private
businesses).
However, while their conjoint experiment includes these five features, the researchers are concerned
primarily with three models of democracy: representative, deliberative, or private. The paper only
discusses the results by aggregating individual institutional features to correspond to these models rather
than examining the effect of the attributes individually. The results suggest that respondents do not
differentiate between the representative and deliberative models but prefer both to the private model.
But this analysis is limited in its generalizability because it constrains how certain features can covary. In
the Appendix, the researchers provide the full disaggregated results showing that support increases when
agreements are adopted by majority rule (as opposed to consensus), when NGOs can participate in the
process, whenmonitoring is performed by the international organization or the government (as opposed
to businesses), and when the agreement is negotiated by parliamentarians, experts or the government as
opposed to the private sector. Another drawback is that the models are too stylized and lack ecological
validity. For instance, in contrasting expert participation with business participation, this design ignores
thatmany forms of global governance are distinguished precisely by the participation of both groups (see
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e.g., the case of global regulatory bodies in Büthe andMattli [2011]).
A more explicit test of authority transfer hypothesis in experimental work can be found in the work
of Anderson and colleagues (2017).3 Using a survey experiment in the US and Germany, the authors
examine how varying levels of authority affect perceived legitimacy of an international agreement to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Increased authority is conceptualized along two dimensions: the voting
rule used in the negotiation of an international agreement and thewhether the agreement is implemented
automatically or requires national legislative approval. Interestingly, and running counter to core tenets
of the authority transfer hypothesis, moving from consensus tomajoritarian decision-making to produce
international agreements aswell asmoving from ratification of these agreements bynational governments
to automatic implementation does not lead to significantly decreased legitimacy perceptions. Anderson
et al (2017) thus produce some of the first concrete empirical evidence challenging the notion that
information about increased authority will invariably depress support for global governance. In
concluding they point toward the potential role of elite cues and the ability of elites to frame these shifts
in ways that depress support. Here, they point to the work of Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) as an initial
foray into examining this question.
Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) use a vignette experiment fielded in Germany, the US, and the UK to
examine confidence in the EU, the IMF, NAFTA, the UN, and the WTO. The paper is relevant for the
current investigation for a number of reasons. Notably, it is the first paper to experimentally test the effect
of elite communication on support for awide range of global governance organizations. The results show
that elites’ framing of international organizations’ performance and procedure affect public perceptions
of legitimacy. Specifically, positive messages claiming the organization is democratic (i.e. procedure) or
doing a good job (i.e. performance) increase support whereas negative messages claiming the reverse
decrease support vis-à-vis a control condition (but note that there is no difference between the procedure
and performance messages).
3It is important to note that the papers by Anderson et al (2017) and Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) are unpublished
working papers written for inclusion in a special issue on international authority that also includes a paper (Tallberg and
Zürn 2017) proffering a more nuanced authority transfer argument in which the role of elites is more explicit than in previous
work. While the two papers are a leap forward in this literature and come closest to the inquiry of this chapter, I suggest that
my examination can go beyond this work by explicitly addressing both arguments simultaneously as well as the interaction
between these factors.
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While this study makes an important contribution, there is room for improvement. First, messages
about procedure and performance are operationalized rather simplistically such that the vignette just
states whether the organization has been praised (criticized) for being ‘highly democratic’ (‘highly
undemocratic) in the procedure condition or whether it is doing a ‘very good job’ (‘very bad job’) in
the performance condition. Second, the source of the elite cue is either the international organization
itself, ‘civil society organizations’, or the respondent’s national government. While interesting, the results
highlight that cues from the internal organization itself are not particularly persuasivewhereas those from
the national government are. I suggest that domestic political dynamics need to be taken more seriously
here (cf. Hooghe andMarks 2015). Specifically, I contend that the conflict of interest is whether national
domestic elites politicize the issue as opposed to international organizations. I posit that respondents are
reacting based on affective cues from national elites. Third, by examining elite rhetoric on organizations
that have already been politicized in the public domain, it is difficult to assess what impact elite cues
can have when citizens have limited prior information about these organizations — it is possible that
elite cues are already baked into support dynamics such that some partisans will automatically reject
these organizations. One indirect illustration of what happens when elites politicize global governance
organizations, for example, comes from a recent study by Johnson and Rickard (2017) who examine
whether framing the 1992 sustainable development policy, Agenda 21, as a UN action changes public
support. While they find no effect in the full sample (300US-basedMTurkers), they do find that the UN
connotation led to decreased support among Republicans. Thus, simply associating a global governance
initiative with the UN led to decreased support among a partisan group, presumably because they had
been exposed to elite rhetoric in the past.
This chapter sets out to expand upon this nascent and rapidly developing literature in a number of
ways. Most importantly, it does so, first, by integrating testing of the authority transfer argument as well
as the elite affective cueing argument in the same empirical design, thereby enabling an examination of
how these two theoretical approaches interact. Second, it explicitly tests whether it matters to whom
authority is ceded, namely whether authority is delegated to organizations operating at the domestic or
the global level.
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argument and hypotheses
The overarching argument I seek to advance in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the traditional
authority transfer hypothesis does not accurately capture the dynamics of support for global governance.
In particular, information about authority being ceded to the supranational level does not automatically
lead to decreased public support for such bodies. Moreover, I predict that — in the absence of elite
politicization — variation in institutional rules will have no (or limited) impact on support. Second, I
argue that elite communication, which provides affective cues suggesting that these same institutional
rules are illegitimate, is the key factor that sways opinions, rather than the information about the
institutional rules per se. Here, I do not simply suggest that partisans will solely follow cues from
co-partisans or engage in motivated reasoning (cf. Lodge and Taber 2013; Leeper and Slothuus 2014)
but rather that any elite rhetoric can decrease support. The rationale behind this expectation is that
the conflict dimension is between traditional governmental governance and new governance and thus
respondents are opposed because the affective cue suggests that the new organization is illegitimate,
thereby potentially undermining national sovereignty. It must be noted though that I do not examine
what happens when the two parties are divided over an organization. In that scenario the expectation
would align more with well established partisan cue-taking dynamics (e.g., Zaller 1992; Lodge and Taber
2013) as respondents are exposed to information from both parties thus changing the dimension of
conflict from traditional governmental governance versus new governance to a simple partisan issue.
That said, I do expect that these effects will be augmented when the partisanship of the cue-giver and
the cue-taker aligns. Importantly, I argue that elite cues can depress support for a global governance
organization even when that organization exhibits the types of institutional properties that the literature
suggests will enhance perceived legitimacy and support and the organization is described as benefitting
US citizens.
In this section, I thus first reiterate the authority transfer hypothesis and expectations derived from it.
Second, I outline the elite cueing hypothesis. The conventional authority transfer hypothesis contends
that citizens who notice that authority is delegated from their national government to supranational
organizations will reject such governance efforts due to their sincere preferences prescribing a role for
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national governmental control. Note that this hypothesis has two related components: organizations
taking on authority and the government having no control over them. The basic hypothesis drawn from
this literature thus suggests:
H1: Public support for regulatory bodies will decrease when authority is ceded to non-governmental
bodies.
While the authority transfer hypothesis is chiefly concerned with the impact of institutional rules
as they relate to increased authority, its empirical examination is also intertwined with the broader
argument that institutional rules matter for support. Here, the normative literature on the legitimacy
of global governance posits that organizations that are transparent, accountable, and that include
avenues for civic participation are more legitimate (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; Buchanan and Keohane
2006). Thus, I extend the argument to include the more general assertion that variation in institutional
rules affects support along the lines suggested by the normative literature on the legitimacy of global
governance.
H2: Public support for regulatory bodies will increase when institutional rules display properties
commonly associated with transparency, participation, and democratic decision-making.
To date the authority transfer hypothesis has been conceptualized as an explanation for how
supranational organizations (originally the EU) become politicized in the eyes of the public. Here, the
theory, as commonly applied, concerns transfer of authority from sovereign nation-states to international
bodies. However, the basic underlying premise of the hypothesis need not be a transfer of authority
beyond the confines of the nation-state. Authority is similarly ceded to non-governmental organizations
at the domestic level.
This chapter, therefore, seeks to establish whether any dynamic of support truly is a ‘global’
phenomenon such that institutional rules and — following my theoretical framework outlined below
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— elite cues have a distinctive ‘international’ effect. Answering this question has the potential to
greatly expand the applicability of the authority transfer hypothesis, and I contend that the alternative
hypothesis — that there is nothing ‘global’ about perceptions of support — is plausible and merits
investigation. Hence, if a key mechanism of opposition to global governance is indeed that authority
is transferred from the domestic domain to the global domain then the following hypothesis should hold:
H3: Public support for regulatory bodies operating at the supranational level will be lower than for
those operating at the domestic level.
The alternative hypothesis simply states that respondents do not distinguish between domestic or
global authority transfer. Besides anymain effect, I amalso interested inwhether any effect of institutional
rules more broadly as well as elite cues are moderated by this distinction. That is, I investigate whether
institutional features affect support differentially depending on whether the organization is described as
having domestic or international jurisdiction.
The above hypotheses suggest that people have sincere preferences that guide their opinion vis-à-vis
global governance organizations. As previously mentioned, however, Hooghe and Marks’ (2005; 2009)
influential postfunctionalist theory of European integration posits that political entrepreneurs played
a central role in mobilizing public tension toward the EU. Their argument implies that people may
not have had strong opinions either way about European integration — as opposed to rejecting any
supranational authority on sincere grounds— but that political elites stoked the rising antipathy toward
the Union for national political gain. This rhetoric can take many forms, ranging from politicization
through claims that the organization is illegitimate and undemocratic to claims that the organization is
a corrupt endeavor seeking to undermine the concept of national sovereignty. The resulting hypothesis
thus emphasizes the role elites can play in shaping attitudes toward global governance:
H4: Public support for regulatory bodies will primarily respond to elite rhetoric containing aective cues.
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However, in contrast to Dellmuth and Tallberg’s (2016) examination of elite communication, I
suggest that — at least in the US case — the most potent distinction between cues will not be between
cues from the international organization and the national government butwill be cues rooted in domestic
politics (cf. Hooghe andMarks 2005; 2009; 2015). This follows from the work on political entrepreneurs
politicizing global governance to amass domestic political support — oftentimes evidenced by fringe or
populist politicians railing against established elites and the permissive consensus that enabled global
governance to develop in the first place.
As I amdisaggregating the elite cue to allow for variation in support at the domestic level (i.e. partisan
polarization on the issue), I suggest that the power of elite cues will be moderated by a respondent’s
partisanship. Note for instance, Johnson and Rickard’s (2017) study in which mention of the UN only
led to decreased support for a global initiative among Republican respondents.
H5: Respondents will respond more strongly to elite cues when they share the same partisanship as the
cue giver.
Up until now I have largely considered the authority transfer hypothesis as unrelated to the elite
cueing hypothesis. Yet, while it is my reading that early articulations of the theory (e.g., Zürn 2014)
conceptualized the process such that citizens would reject global organizations when they became aware
that authority was ceded from the nation-state, more recent iterations of this theoretical framework
acknowledge the importance of elite cues in mobilizing opposition (Tallberg and Zürn 2017; Zürn 2018).
This acknowledgement, I argue, poses a fundamental question for the nature of the relationship between
these two theoretical approaches.
Do citizens truly have sincere concerns about global governance such that they deem it illegitimate
because authority has been ceded from their national government, but they require elites to make this
connection obvious? The idea that people may not inherently disapprove of all forms of authority
beyond the nation-state is compatible with research demonstrating that citizens do not universally reject
non-traditional forms of governance (cf. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). This revised argument
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suggests that increased authority is a necessary but not sufficient condition for declining support
for global governance organizations. In this formulation, elite cues simply allow people to arrive at
conclusions that reflect their underlying attitudes. By contrast, I suggest that elite cues work irrespective
of the facts regarding the institutional arrangements. This is where the importance of the interaction
between the ‘authority transfer’ argument and the elite cueing argument comes into play.
Lastly, I am interested in the role that citizens’ attitudes toward the domain of regulation and their
perceived importance of regulation play in shaping support. In particular, I investigate whether the effect
of institutional rules and elite cues are conditioned by individuals’ underlying preferences.
method: conjoint experiment
To test the above hypotheses, I leverage a conjoint experimental design embedded in two online
surveys. Conjoint experiments have recently gained traction in political science as a means of examining
treatment effects for more dimensions than are usually feasible using factorial or vignette designs (see
e.g., Hainmueller et al. 2013). Indeed, some of the studies highlighted in the literature review rely on this
design to test the effect of a multitude of procedural and performance factors on the perceived legitimacy
of international agreements.
Importantly, the conjoint design enables me to not only examine how institutional features and elite
cues affect support for global governance organizations while holding other factors constant, but it also
provides for examinations of conditional effects. This allows for more nuanced testing of the effects of
institutional design and expanded supranational authority. Specifically, I can examine whether variation
in institutional design does indeed shape opinion in the absence of politicization and elite cues.
I use a paired conjoint design inwhich respondents are asked to evaluate pairs of organizations and to
indicate which organization they support more as well as how legitimate they perceive each organization.
The general paired design has been validated against a behavioral benchmark and found to performbetter
than single-profile designs (Hainmueller et al. 2015). Respondents sequentially evaluate five conjoint
pairs where each pair features six attributes. Based on research by Bansak and colleagues (2017; 2018), the
number of conjoint pairs and features should lead to no satisficing concerns.
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Table 4.1: Overview of Conjoint Attributes & Attribute Levels
Attribute Attribute Levels
What type of organization is it? Domestic (US)International
Howmuch authority does the organization have?
Limited authority to create new regulation
Some authority to create new regulation
Extensive authority to create new rules
Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
What is the likelihood that regulation will benefit US citizens?
High
Modest
Low
How transparent and open is decision-making?
Not transparent and no involvement of citizen groups,
scientists or business groups
Somewhat transparent and some involvement of citizen groups,
scientists and business groups
Very transparent and formal involvement of citizen groups,
scientists and business groups
What role does the US government play?
Government has no formal role
Government voted to establish body
Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
Government voted to establish body,
monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
Have any groups taken a position on this organization?
Organization is not politically contested
Organization has bi-partisan support
Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
Respondents are introduced to the conjoint choice task through a vignette that provides some
background on the task. Here, I randomly assign respondents to one of three conditions in
which the task is either described without reference to a domain of regulation (control), described
as regulation to “strengthen environmental protections” or described as regulation to “strengthen
workplace protections”. Thismanipulation provides additional leverage to examine howpreferences and
issue priorities affect support.4
Preferences for the domain of regulation and perceived importance of such regulation are measured
earlier in the survey. Support is measured with the question “How strongly do you favor or oppose
regulation to strengthen [environmental/workplace] protections?” with response options ranging from
“favor strongly” to “oppose strongly” on a five-point Likert scale. Importance is measured with the
question “How important do you feel [environmental/workplace] regulations are?” with response
options ranging from “not at all important” to “extremely important” on a five-point scale.
4This manipulation worked as intended although there were significant differences between the two samples. In the
MTurk sample 85 percent of respondents in both the environmental protection and worker protection conditions reported
that the task was focused on the issue area they were assigned to. However, this figure was somewhat lower in the SSI sample
in which only 62 percent of respondents reported the condition correctly
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Next, I introduce the individual attributes and explain how they operationalize the key concepts I
am interested in. See Table 4.1 for an overview of all six attributes and all possible attribute levels. The
attribute levels randomly vary both within and across the comparisons (see Figure 4.1 for an example of
the choice task respondents are asked to evaluate).
Figure 4.1: Example of a Conjoint Task
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I include one output (or performance) dimension by providing information about the likelihood
that the organization’s regulations will benefit US citizens. Including information about the potential
distributive consequences follows a similar logic to other conjoint experiments that are interested in
examining how much varying the cost or benefit of a proposal changes support (e.g., Bernauer and
Gampfer 2015). Here, it is interesting to examine the direct effects of distributive consequences, especially
given the authority transfer hypothesis’ claim that it is a combination of awareness of authority and
distributive consequences that makes people reject global authority.
Tooperationalizewhether anorganization is politicized I include an attribute containing information
about elite rhetoric. I allow the organization to either be de-politicized or vary which domestic actor
provides an affective cue highlighting concerns about the legitimacy of the organization. This attribute is
similar to one used in Bechtel and colleagues’ (2017) conjoint experiment into support for international
bailouts in which they include information about actors (such as the government, the opposition, the
national central bank or international organizations) who endorse the bailout. This attribute enables
testing of the elite cueing hypotheses as well as the conditional hypotheses.
For each pair of organizations respondents are asked which one of the two organizations they prefer.
This forced-choice binary question gauges support and the introductory vignette explains that I am
asking aboutwhichorganization they supportmore. I thenuse the cjointR-package (Strezhnev et al. 2015)
to estimates AverageMarginal Component Effects (AMCEs) as described byHainmueller and colleagues
(2014). The resulting estimates can be interpreted as the expected change in the probability that an
organization is preferred when the attribute level in question is compared to the baseline level for that
attribute.
pre-testing the authority transfer attributes
One concernwith the conjoint design—both in general andmore specifically in the context of a complex
issue — is whether respondents actually notice and understand the different attribute levels. While it
could be argued that any statistically significant effect in such an experiment is evidence that respondents
were reactive to something, the inverse is not true if such a test yields no significant results. A non-result
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could be caused either because the attributes really do not affect respondents or because respondents
simply did not recognize or understand the attributes.
Hence, there is a need to validate the conjoint design to ensure that the attributes that are meant to
operationalize the more complex authority transfer hypothesis, in particular, are really capturing what I
intend them to capture. Thus, I need to assess whether respondents notice that certain attribute features
imply that the national government has more or less control over the organizations’ as well as showing
that other features vary the amount of authority that the organizations have. These two factors are key
to the authority transfer hypothesis and thus any design trying to counter this theory should be able to
demonstrate that a null effect is not the result of a failed manipulation. Therefore, I conducted a pre-test
on an MTurk sample (n=250) in which each respondent completed five conjoint tasks. This reduced
(fully randomized) conjoint included three attributes drawn from the larger conjoint: the key attribute
operationalizing organization authority (i.e. how much authority does the organization have), the key
attribute operationalizing government control (i.e. what role does the US government play) as well as a
filler attribute operationalizing how transparent the organization is.
For each conjoint pair, respondents were asked two binary choice questions: (1) over which
organization do you think the US government has more control and (2) which organization do you
think has more power? The expectation is that responses to the first question are primarily driven by the
attribute operationalizing government controlwhereas the responses to the secondquestion are primarily
driven by the attribute operationalizing organization authority. The results are presented in Figures 4.4
and 4.5 in the Appendix. First, the three attributes of increasing levels of government control increase the
likelihood that respondents deem the government to have control over the organization by roughly 20,
30, and 40 percentage points. By contrast, the remaining attributes exert no influence over perceptions
that the government has control. Second, compared to the baseline (limited authority), respondents are
12 percentage points more likely to say an organization has power when the organization is described
as having some authority and 33 percentage points more likely when it is described as having extensive
authority. The level “fulfills role previously exercised by national governments” falls in between the
former two by increasing the likelihood by 19 percentage points. Overall then, these results suggest that
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the attributes operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis work as intended.
samples
I fielded the conjoint experiment on two different samples. First, I fielded it in March 2018
using respondents (n=1002) recruited through the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). The survey was restricted to U.S.-based adults. Previous research has validated MTurk as a
subject pool with reasonable correspondence to the U.S. population (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and
Tingley 2015). As is the case formostMTurk samples, the samplewas relative young (mean ageof 39 years),
more highly educated (53% with 4-year college degree or above), predominantly White (76% White),
roughly balanced as to sex (46% female) and skewed liberal (51%Democrat when including leaners). That
said, recent research shows that experimental effects across twelve studies generalized from the original
sample toMTurk samples (Coppock 2018). Second, inApril-May 2018 I contractedwith Survey Sampling
International (SSI) for a sample (n=1000) of US adults balanced by age, sex, ethnicity, and census region.
The resulting sample was 52% female, 66%White and respondents’ mean age was 42 years. The partisan
breakdown was 45%Democrat, 16% Independent, and 39% Republican. It is important to note that this
chapter, given the conjoint design, does not discuss point estimates but rather discusses experimental
effects. Nonetheless, in the conclusion, I discuss the limitations of these samples as they pertain to the
estimation of effect sizes. As I administered the same conjoint experiment in both samples, I pool the
data. However, I also discuss how results differ between the two samples.
results
The main effects of the conjoint experiment are presented in Figure 4.2 where the point estimates are
the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) and the lines are the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals. The estimates represent the expected change in the probability that an organization is preferred
when the attribute level in question is compared to the respective baseline level.
First, I am interested in the authority transfer hypothesis which was operationalized through two
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Figure 4.2: Main Effects in Conjoint Experiment (SSI andMTurk Samples Combined)
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
−0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Change in E[Y]
attributes measuring how much authority the organization has as well as how much control the US
government has. The pre-test results indicated that respondents understood the consequences of these
attributes. However, contrary to the expectations laid out inH1 these two attributes have no discernible
effects on the probability that an organization is preferred. Specifically, varying the amount of authority
that organizations have (ranging from limited to extensive authority) as well as government control over
these organizations (ranging from no formal control to control that includes veto power) does not affect
respondents’ probability of supporting an organization. Indeed, the only two attributes that are not
statistically significant are the ones operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis and it appears that
respondents do not reject organizations because they acquire authority without governmental control.
Importantly, however, the fact that increased authority and a loss of governmental control do not
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affect support does not mean that objective facts about the organizations do not matter. In fact, the
two factors producing the largest shifts in support are (1) the expected benefit of the organization to
US citizens, with higher likelihoods increasing the probability the organization will be preferred by
11 and 18 percentage points for the “modest” and “high” levels, respectively; and (2) in line with H2
increased transparency and involvement of interest groups increases support. More specifically, when
compared to procedures described as “not transparent”, procedures described as “somewhat transparent”
or “very transparent” with input from interest groups increases support by 14 and 22 percentage points,
respectively. Of course, while it has to be acknowledged that perceptions of transparency can themselves
be affected by elite rhetoric, respondents seem to be extremely concernedwith transparency. This finding
highlights an important avenue for the legitimation of regulatory organizations and the framing of
institutional arrangements.
Second, I am interested in evaluatingwhether support for organizations differs depending on the level
of jurisdiction to establish whether the global nature of regulation really matters. This does seem to be
the case: when an organization is described as “international” the probability that the organization will
be preferred decreases by seven percentage points. While in line with H3, I suggest that the magnitude
of this effect is substantively smaller than expected. Moreover, additional analyses suggest that the other
attributes do not operate significantly different dependent on whether the organization is described as
domestic or international.
Third, I turn to the effect of elite cues. In line with H4, we see that elite cues substantively
affect support for all respondents. While these effects are potentially smaller in size than expected, the
unconditional results suggest that this is not a simple partisandynamic. Indeed, compared to the attribute
level operationalizing no politicization (i.e. that the organization is not politically contested), cues by
journalists, Democrats, and Republicans raising concerns about legitimacy all decrease support by a
corresponding 6, 8, and 7 percentage points. Thus, as hypothesized, elite rhetoric can powerfully decrease
support for both domestic and global regulatory bodies. Moreover, it is worth noting that stating that an
organization has bi-partisan support increases support by 3 percentage points. While there was no clear
hypothesis about this attribute level, it is interesting that cues are asymmetrical whereby respondents are
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more affected by negative politicization cues than by positive cues.
In Figure 4.6 in the Appendix, I show these same results broken down independently for theMTurk
and SSI samples. The patterns are identical across the two samples — in both samples there are no
significant effects for either of the two attributes operationalizing the authority transfer hypotheses
whereas there are significant effects for the elite cues. It is worth noting, however, that the magnitude
of the effect sizes differ with effect sizes being larger for theMTurk sample. For instance, the effect for the
journalist, Democrat, and Republican elite cues is 9, 13, and 8 percentage points in the MTurk samples
whereas the corresponding numbers in the SSI sample are 4, 4, and 6 percentage points. Thus, while
the interpretation of the conjoint results is the same across the samples, effects are generally stronger in
the MTurk sample. Similarly, the effects for the remaining attributes (i.e., ‘transparency’, ‘benefits’, and
‘international’) all behave the same way in both samples with the only difference again being that the
effect sizes are slightly larger in theMTurk sample. I attribute these differences to variation in respondent
attentiveness. As mentioned previously, MTurk respondents were significantly more likely than SSI
respondents to correctly recall the topic of regulation (which they were randomly assigned to). This
is probably due to the fact that MTurk respondents are paying more attention due to the way MTurk
compensation works.
Beyond these main effects of elite cues, to evaluate H5 it is important to examine the role of cues
conditional on respondents’ own partisan identification. Figure 4.3 breaks down the effects of attributes
for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. In line with expectations, cues from co-partisan elites
have the greatest impact on support. ForDemocrat respondents, aDemocrat cue calling into question the
legitimacy of an organization decreases support by 11 percentage pointswhile forRepublican respondents
an in-party cue decreases support by 8 percentage points. In line with my conjecture that this dynamic
is not solely a partisan dynamic, affective cues from the outparty reduces support among Democrats by
6 percentage points and among Republicans by 5 percentage points. The cues from journalists reduces
support by 8 percentage points among Democrats and by 4 percentage points among Republicans. For
independents, all negative cues reduce the probability of preferring an organization by 7-9 percentage
points. These results confirmH5 as respondents respond more strongly to co-partisan cues, but it is also
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Figure 4.3: Unpacking Response to Elite Cues by Respondent Party Affiliation (SSI andMTurk Samples
Combined)
Conditional on
party = Democrat
Conditional on
party = Republican
−0.2 0.0 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
Change in E[Y]
worth noting that the substantive size of these effects is smaller than the effects of the transparency and
benefit attributes.
Lastly, Figure 4.7 in theAppendixbreaks down the results basedon the issuedimensionmanipulation
that was included in the vignette introducing the conjoint experiment while Figures 4.8 and 4.9 break
down the results by respondents’ underlying issue preferences and issue importance for environmental
and workplace regulation, respectively. There is no heterogeneity by issue dimension (recall that this
was randomly assigned and that 85% of respondents in the Mturk sample and 62% in the SSI sample
correctly recalled the condition they were assigned to). Moreover, while analyzing effects conditional
on both respondent-level preferences for environmental protection/workplace protection as well as the
importance of these types of regulations reveals slight differences in the observedmagnitude of effects, the
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key institutional features operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis do not exhibit heterogeneity
based on underlying beliefs.
In summary, the results from the conjoint experiment do not provide support for the authority
transfer hypothesis as institutional features pertaining to the amount of authority that organizations have
as well as the power that governments have over these organizations do not affect support. Furthermore,
while elite cues do affect support as predicted, these effects are smaller than the role of transparency or
information about the likely benefit of the regulatory body to US citizens.
conclusion
This chapter set out to examine what factors shape public support for organizations involved in global
governance. Specifically, I contrasted hypotheses drawn from the authority transfer hypothesis with
hypotheses centering on the power of elite cues to shift opinion. The results from the conjoint
experiment provided no support for direct operationalizations of the authority transfer hypothesis
based on information about increased authority of organizations and decreased governmental control.
However, this did not mean that institutional features were irrelevant as the largest effects were observed
for information concerning the transparencyof organizations. Therewas also strong evidence that output
legitimacy matters as information about the likely benefit of regulation to citizens led to substantial
increases in support.
The results also provided clear evidence that elite rhetoric matters. Elite cues painting organizations
as illegitimate — especially from co-partisans — had the power to decrease respondents’ support
for governance organizations. Importantly, the story here is not simply one of motivated reasoning
by partisans, but there is some evidence that cues from domestic elites can decrease support
for non-governmental governance irrespective of the partisan affiliation of the cue-giver and the
cue-taker. Moreover, the fact that respondents react strongly to information about the transparency of
organizations has implications for the role of elite rhetoric. This dimension, arguably, is very amenable
to elite manipulation and it is possible that elites can be successful at branding an organization as lacking
transparency irrespective of the actual institutional mechanisms. Future research should unpack what
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happens when elites seek to delegitimize organizations on the grounds of not being transparent and
whether this strategy is effective irrespective of organizations’ actual level of transparency.
Due to the nature of the conjoint experiment, this chapter was concerned with estimating effects
rather than producing point estimates. That said, it is nonetheless important to note the limitations of
the current samples as they pertain to effect sizes. Indeed, while the two samples produced converging
results, I noted that there were important differences in the sizes of the effects. Some of these differences
are attributable to differences in attention (as evidenced by the differential passage of the manipulation
check) and it is conceivable that respondents in these convenience samples are more attentive to stimuli
than respondents in a more representative sample. It is also possible that there are heterogeneous effects
that would result in changes in effect size when moving to a more representative sample. For example,
if the Republican respondents in the present samples are more highly educated and cosmopolitan than
Republicans in the population and these factors affect the extent to which they respond to the cues, then
a more representative sample may reveal a different pattern. In future work, I thus plan to extend this
line of inquiry using more representative samples.
It is also worth highlighting that while the analyses in this paper were not explicitly concerned
with the case of the EU, which has been the focus of previous politicization research, the findings
are nonetheless relevant for that case. Indeed, the EU can be considered one potential combination
of conjoint attributes (e.g., having authority previously held by nation-states or the role of national
governments inmonitoring regulation). Thus, the finding that these institutional features do not, in fact,
affect support contributes to the literature on theEU’s politicization and the authority transfer hypothesis
which have posited that those features led to decreased public support. That said, it is important to
acknowledge that the current results are based on US samples and thus respondents exist in a context
in which they have no tangible experience with the EU. Future work should replicate this design on
a European sample to examine whether the results hold in that context. More broadly, however, this
chapter highlights the benefits of looking beyond the EU case to examine how institutional features affect
public support for decision-making arrangements and features that are central to a plethora of global
governance organizations.
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These findings have important implications for the literature on the politicization of global
governance and the potential legitimation of organizations involved in both domestic and international
regulation. Importantly, contrary to the narrative in the extant literature, institutional features may not
be the key factors affecting support — with the exception of perceptions regarding the transparency of
organizations. Thus, legitimation strategies need not be as concerned with the intricacies of institutional
design, but rather with the processes proving transparency and participation. However, the results also
suggest that legitimation will be difficult in the face of domestic elite cues seeking to paint organizations
as illegitimate. As the shift from “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus” in the context of
the EU foreshadowed, elite rhetoric has the power to delegitimize global governance. Future work should
examine the conditions under which objective information can trump elite cues but initial findings from
this study suggest that focusing on perceptions of transparency and output (i.e. potential benefits)
provide potentially potent legitimation strategies in the face of elite politicization.
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appendix
Additional Figures
Figure 4.4: Effects of Conjoint Attributes on Perception that the US government has control over the
organization (Pre-Test)
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
0.0 0.2 0.4
Change in E[Y]
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Figure 4.5: Effects of Conjoint Attributes on Perception that the organization has authority (Pre-Test)
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
−0.25 0.00 0.25
Change in E[Y]
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Figure 4.6: Main Effects in Conjoint Experiment broken down by Sample
Conditional on
sample = MTurk
Conditional on
sample = SSI
−0.2 0.0 0.2 −0.2 0.0 0.2
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
Change in E[Y]
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Figure 4.7: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Manipulation
Conditional on
Condition = Control
Conditional on
Condition = Environment
Conditional on
Condition = Workers
−0.2−0.10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3−0.2−0.10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3−0.2−0.10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
Change in E[Y]
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Figure 4.8: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Preference
Conditional on
preference = 25%
Conditional on
preference = 50%
Conditional on
preference = 75%
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
Change in E[Y]
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Figure 4.9: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Importance
Conditional on
important = 25%
Conditional on
important = 50%
Conditional on
important = 75%
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
   Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
   Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules
   Government voted to establish body
   (Baseline = Government has no formal role)
What.role.does.the.US.government.play:
   High
   Modest
   (Baseline = Low)
What.is.the.likelihood.that.regulation.will.benefit.US.citizens:
   Very transparent and formal input from citizen groups, scientists and business groups
   Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
   (Baseline = Not transparent and no input from citizen groups, scientists, or business groups)
How.transparent.and.open.is.decision−making:
   Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
   Extensive authority to create new regulation
   Some authority to create new regulation
   (Baseline = Limited authority to create new regulation)
How.much.authority.does.the.organization.have:
   Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy
   Organization has bi−partisan support
   (Baseline = Organization is not politically contested)
Have.any.groups.taken.a.position.on.this.organization:
   International
   (Baseline = Domestic)
What.type.of.organization.is.it:
Change in E[Y]
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation began with the premise that we face a worldwide governance dilemma, where, on the
one hand, increased international cooperation is needed to efficiently manage a globalized economy and
to address some of the world’s most pressing coordination problems. While on the other hand, much
of this coordination is orchestrated by a plethora of organizations that are not subject to control by the
democratically-elected governments of nation-states andnot necessarily responsive to democratic publics.
I started by suggesting that, at present, public opinion toward a host of international governance
arrangements, including private regulatory bodies, can be described using Lindberg and Scheingold’s
(1970) moniker of a ‘permissive consensus’ in which the public plays a passive role and its opinions
have no impact on the workings and effectiveness of bodies such as the ISO or the FSC. The idea
of such a ‘permissive consensus’ originated nearly half a century ago to describe the lack of public
contestation toward EU integration, when European elites weremoving toward ever greater unionwhilst
the European public was sidelined as a passive bystander. In Europe, this ‘permissive consensus’ has
given way to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). European public opinion is now
consequential for the future of the continent’s cooperative endeavor as most recently and forcefully
illustrated by the British public’s vote to withdraw from the Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.
Using this trajectory as apoint of departure, I contended that there are also cracks in thebroader global
‘permissive consensus’ toward global governance writ large and the myriad organizations that have not
yet becomehousehold names. Oneneed lookno further than the rhetoric of populist parties in Europe or
even of President Trump to appreciate the fragility of the current ‘permissive consensus’ (e.g., Zürn 2018;
Haufler 2018). Indeed, research has shown that the EU actually performs better on multiple indicators
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of democratic accountability and legitimacy than other regional integration bodies that have not received
the same sort of public contestation (Duina and Lenz 2018). Thus, politicization of the organizations
discussed in this dissertation may be just one tweet away.
Importantly, I suggested that we have insufficient knowledge of how this politicization will occur
and what will drive public dissatisfaction. I noted that important theories of how and why this type of
politicization occurs simply cannot adequately be tested by looking at the EU case because we lack a valid
counterfactual inasmuch as we cannot examine these dynamics absent of the politicization that already
has taken place. So, what did we learn from shifting the focus to the increasingly important domain of
global private governance as well as governance arrangements more broadly?
Taken together, the chapters in this dissertation brought new evidence to bear on the question of
how global governance organizations become politicized and subsequently opposed by the public. In
contrast to prominent approaches in the EU literature, across six studies I found little to no evidence
that awareness of global governance organizations’ institutional design depressed support. Rather, the
results in Chapters Three and Four provided consistent evidence that elite frames — providing affective
cues suggesting that these same institutional arrangements are illegitimate and undemocratic — drive
opposition. Thus, the findings highlight that public opposition to global governance is primarily driven
by how global organizations are described by elites rather than what their institutional arrangements are.
These findings have clear implications for the debate surrounding the legitimacy of not just global
private regulation but global governance organizations more broadly. The research herein suggests that
the public is potentiallymore accepting of governance arrangements centered around expert and industry
involvement than one might assume given their unelected governance structure. Indeed, support for
these types of organizations will not inevitably decline with increased awareness of their decision-making
structures. However, my results also show that this support is very fragile and that elite rhetoric providing
affective cues can easily depress support. Here, this dissertation thus also contributes to the growing
literature on populism by shedding light on politicians’ ability to politicize both governance bodies and
specific decision-making structures. The dissertation delineated the fertile ground for rhetoric aimed
at delegitimizing supranational organizations, which could easily be incorporated as part of a populist
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agenda. The script writes itself. Populist politicians around the globe can rail against global organizations
lacking national governmental control yet developing standards that may impact domestic firms and
industries. A vast literature in political science has sought to assess how a similar politicization scenario
unfolded— after the fact — in the case of the EU. Expanding the scope of inquiry to organizations that
have to date not been politicized contributes a novel insight to that literature.
Beyond these substantive findings and implications, this dissertation also contributed to our
understanding of framing effects. In Chapter Two I introduced a new conceptualization of ‘framing
effects’, which argued that the exposure to frames can shape people’s initial belief structure of novel
attitude objects. Thus, rather than simply shifting attitudes, the real power of repeated frames may be
that it changes the way people make sense of new information in ways that allow them to abstract up
from framed information they encounter to make sense of new information. Thus, framing effects in
this conceptualization are broader than previous conceptualizations would suggest as they create new
cognitive architectures that have the power to affect opinions on more abstract attitude objects. In the
context of global private governance and international standard-setting, I showed how framing these
organizations by emphasizing either ‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ dimensions led some respondents to use
this type of language when describing a new organization they were introduced to. Importantly, while I
uncovered these effects there were no strong and consistent effects of the frames on attitudes about these
organizations. Hence, I suggest that future work should pay more attention that framing can play in
shaping understanding and not just attitudes.
This dissertation has sought to chart new ground by examining public opinion dynamics in a
substantive area that has to date received limited attention. I suggest that the substantive results advance
our understanding of the current state of public opinion vis-à-vis a class of global organizations that have
been largely overlooked in public opinion scholarship. Besides laying this descriptive foundation, I also
elucidated the factors that lead global governance organizations more broadly to become contested by
the public. Moreover, I developed a novel approach for conceptualizing and measuring ‘framing effects’,
which allowedme to demonstrate how exposure to frames shapes how people come tomake sense of the
political world. That said, this project, like any study, has limitations that need to be acknowledged.
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First, examining public opinion toward organizations that have to date largely operated outside of
general public awareness comes with a substantial drawback, namely the acute lack of existing survey
data to work with. On the one hand, I have proffered that designing original surveys afforded me
the possibility to design instrumentation that helped attenuate a potential non-attitudes problem by
comparing responses in ‘no information’ conditions with responses in baseline conditions. On the other
hand, thismeans that the six surveys in this dissertationwere fielded on samples that cannot purport to be
fully representative. Four of the six come from crowdsourced convenience samples (MTurk) that, while
validated both as subject pools (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012) and as means to test experimental effects that
generalize to more representative populations (e.g., Coppock 2018), differ from national benchmarks in
important ways such as partisanship. This prevents me from claiming that the observed levels of support
correspond to the actual observed value of support in the US population. The two SSI samples, while
somewhat more diverse do not constitute representative samples either. Thus these point estimates and
effect sizes should also be interpreted cautiously as the general population may be less supportive of
global governance than the current samples suggest and the effects may be smaller. Indeed, it is possible
that the SSI sample, while including more Republican respondents, oversamples more highly educated
Republicans that may not be representative of that group as a whole. Moreover, the SSI samples suffer
from an additional drawback, namely respondents who are paying less close attention to the task at
hand. In future work, I will thus seek to employ both more representative samples as well as maximizing
respondent attention through survey instrumentation that heightens respondents’ engagement with the
vignettes and survey tasks.
Furthermore, the studies in this dissertation examined US public opinion toward global governance.
But the theoretical framework I put forward is a general one that calls out for cross-national testing.
Indeed, examining these questions comparatively opens up a range of future research opportunities,
including examination of the extent to which support for global private governance is related to support
for other forms of global governance such as attitudes toward the EU.
Second, the experiments in this paper sought to maximize internal validity, sometimes at the
expense of ecological and external validity. In particular, the experimental stimuli relied on stylized
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representations of organizations and institutional arrangements that sought to carefully operationalize
key hypotheses. Future work should thus expand on this research with more realistic stimuli that are
presented to respondents in a manner that more convincingly mirrors their information environment.
Relatedly, likemanyother studies on framing and information effects, this project suffers from reliance on
experiments at the expense of broader ecological validity (cf. Kinder 2007). Although I sought to address
one common pitfall through an experiment that included repeated exposure to stimuli, my experiments
still only looked at the consumption and not the supply of rhetoric about global private governance. In
particular, future work will need to examine both the frames that people are exposed to in the real world
and how people receive those frames. In part, the substantive focus of this project made such a design
infeasible precisely given the lack of politicization and public contestation of organizations like the ISO
or the FSC. That said, there is potential for a study that monitors and tracks bothmedia narratives about
global governance and public opinion once these debates emerge in public discourse.
Fourth, in the second chapter I introduced novel instrumentation to measure cognitive
internalization. While I found some evidence of internalization using themeasures based on open-ended
responses, it has to be acknowledged that the overall observed levels of internalization were quite
low. The question, then, is whether this was due to the absence of a true effect or problems with
measurement. Evidence from the word association questions might lead us to believe that it was the
latter. Therefore, more work is needed to refine measurement using open-ended prompts or to devise
alternative measurement strategies.
In closing, this dissertation leveraged the case of global private governance as a means to study
the broader phenomenon of attitudes toward global governance in no small part because it enabled
studying the dynamics of support in a context for which the counterfactual of ‘no politicization’ was
valid. Only time will tell if and when these organizations become politically contested by the public. It
has already been noted that “to the extent that private authority grows, questions of accountability will
become increasingly important” (Green 2014: 178) and that “the debate on how to render global private
governance more accountable and legitimate has only just begun” (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 225). It is my
hope that the research in the preceding pages will contribute to this debate.
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